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Production processes are increasingly fragmented geographically, and the performance of
production tasks is spread across countries. As multinational production progresses, an intriguing
phenomenon arises which is referred to as countries and firms “moving up the global value chain.”
While many people may have an informal understanding of what it means, testable definitions and
examinations of the dynamics are lacking.
My dissertation aims to provide a unified framework to address the meaning and mechanism
of the dynamics of global production and value chain. Task-based theoretical models are developed
to explore and characterize the dynamics, which arise from learning-by-doing. Using firm-level
data, empirical support for the important theoretical predictions is found. The model is further
extended to incorporate the innovation effect, which explains the rising phenomenon of reshoring.
Following the first and second chapter for introduction and literature review, in Chapter 3, I
develop a dynamic task-based model of multinational production. The technology of producing a
final good is modeled as a spectrum of tasks ranked by their degree of technological sophistication.
The global value chain of an industry is thus described as a sequence of tasks that may be spread
across countries, with each task adding value to the final good. “Moving up the global value chain”
is then defined as an upgrading in the set of tasks that a country, an industry, or a firm conducts.
The basic model features the critical role of learning-by-doing in the dynamic production
process. Initially, developed countries (the North) offshore simple tasks to developing countries
(the South). The South may receive tasks beyond its technological capability. By conducting the
“beyond” tasks, the South improves its efficiency on relatively sophisticated tasks. This learning-by-
doing effect enables more complex tasks to be offshored in the next period. This process continues
until the Southern technological capability matches the set of tasks offshored. Both types of coun-
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tries move up the global value chain during this process – the South conducts additional and harder
tasks, while the North concentrates on fewer but the most highly sophisticated activities. The evo-
lution of multinational production is characterized by the task offshoring threshold moving up to
its steady state, with the movement pace slowing down over time – thus a concave-shaped path.
The dynamics of other economic aspects, including wage rates and national welfare, are discussed.
In Chapter 4, I develop the dynamic theory of global production within a monopolistic
competition framework. Products are differentiated by variety, with each variety being produced
by a multinational firm. Countries and firms move up the global value chain due to firms’ learning-
by-doing effects, as the Southern subsidiaries engage in a wider range of and more sophisticated
tasks, while the Northern counterparts do fewer but more complex activities. The number of
varieties increases and displays a converging pattern of growth during the evolution process, and
this expansion at the extensive margin is the main source of welfare gains for both countries.
The situation under autarky and the dynamic gains from offshoring are examined. Under
monopolistic competition, the South may experience a welfare loss in the short run upon participat-
ing in global production. However, in the long run, the learning-by-doing effect will lead the South
to be better off than its autarky situation. Meanwhile, the North enjoys a higher level of welfare
at the beginning of joining global production, and the gain continues in the long run. Hence, both
types of countries get rewarded from offshoring, though their paths are quite different.
The task-based theory predicts that as multinational production evolves, the Southern coun-
try’s share of value added in total value of industrial output increases over time, while the growth
rate declines – thus a concave-shaped path. In Chapter 5, a micro-founded approach is applied to
test the dynamics of the value-added ratio (VR) of global production contributed by the South. By
using a subsidiary-level dataset on China’s multinational operation spanning 10 years, the evolution
pattern of industry-level VR is examined. The results show that convergence evidences are present,
and the industrial VR dynamics are mainly driven by changes within multinational subsidiaries.
Chapter 6 extends the model to incorporate innovation in developed home countries. Task al-
location depends on countries’ relative efficiency of conducting tasks. When both countries improve
vdomestic technologies simultaneously – one through learning and the other through innovation, the
dynamics of multinational production are determined by the countries’ relative speed of technology
improvement. Both offshoring expansion and reshoring may occur, where reshoring refers to the
phenomenon that previously offshored tasks return to their originating home countries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Currently, global economic activities feature a complex multinational production network
with a prominent role played by international task trade, as production processes become increas-
ingly fragmented geographically and the performance of production tasks is spread across the globe.
It is not unusual for a final good to have components or technology produced in a high-income coun-
try, which are then exported to a lower-income country where final assembly occurs, with the final
product exported back to the originating high-income country.
Over time, an intriguing phenomenon arises which is widely referred to as countries and firms
“moving up along the value chain of global production.” The phrase is used, for instance, (1) in
describing the fact that the Brazilian automotive industry, starting with an assembly line built by
General Motors, now develops new car models and has become among the world’s largest vehicle
producers; (2) as the reason why Asian-Tiger economies experienced rapid industrialization and
maintained high growth rates for decades after World War II; and (3) as the recipe for OECD
countries to stay competitive in the global environment. While many people may have an informal
understanding of what “moving up the global value chain” means, testable definitions and exam-
inations of mechanisms of the dynamics involved in this process are lacking. In particular, what
is the chain variable? Who is on the chain? Why do countries and firms claim they move up the
chain altogether, even if they are at quite different development stages? And how do countries and
firms move along the chain?
Exploring these issues, my dissertation aims to provide a unified framework to address the
2meaning and mechanism of the dynamics of global production. This chapter, as a brief introduction,
will provide an overview of the dissertation. After a review of literature in Chapter 2, Chapter 3
introduces the basic task-based model of multinational production, which is briefly outlined here
in Section 1.1. Section 1.2 provides an overview of the dynamic theory of global production in
monopolistic competition, which is presented in Chapter 4. Section 1.3 overviews the empirical
investigation with subsidiary-level data on China’s multinational operation. A theoretical extension
incorporating innovation into the framework is briefly introduced in Section 1.4.
1.1 A Dynamic Theory of Global Production: A Task-Based Perspective
In Chapter 3 of my dissertation, I develop a unified dynamic task-based theory on global
production with the technology for producing a final good modeled as a spectrum of production
tasks which are ranked by their degree of technological sophistication. Moving up the global value
chain is then given a specific definition as an upgrading in the set of tasks that a country, an
industry or a firm conducts. For different countries and firms, the upgrading pattern may vary.
The model features the role of learning-by-doing in the production process, within a perfect
competition framework. At the start, developed countries (the North) offshore relatively simple
tasks to developing countries (the South). The South acquires certain tasks that are moderately
beyond its technological capability. These tasks provide the South with opportunities to improve
its production technology through the learning-by-doing effect. This enables the South to carry
out the relatively sophisticated tasks more efficiently, which then leads to more complex tasks
being offshored in the next period. This self-reinforcing process continues until the technological
capability of the South matches the tasks offshored – the long-run steady state. Over time, the
Southern coverage of the task spectrum becomes increasingly wide and sophisticated, while the
Northern coverage, although narrower over time, concentrates on the tasks involving the highest
degree of sophistication.
The movement of global production equilibrium is characterized by the task threshold of
offshoring moving toward its steady state, with the movement pace slowing down over time. The
3evolution of the Southern task scope thus displays a concave-shaped time path, with the steady
state being the upper bound. During this process, other aspects of global production also converge
to their long-run steady states. The time dynamics of wage rates, output and national welfare levels
are examined. Gains from offshoring are also analyzed. The findings indicate that compared with
autarky, both the South and the North gain from participating in global production and evolving
with offshoring and learning dynamics. While the short-run gain presents for both, the long-run
gain at the steady state is mainly for developing countries.
1.2 The Dynamics of Global Value Chain in Monopolistic Competition
Based on the basic model, I further develop the dynamic theory of global production within
a monopolistic competition framework in Chapter 4. Products are differentiated by brand, with
each brand being produced by a single firm. With offshoring, firms become multinational enter-
prises (MNEs), with relatively simple tasks being offshored to the Southern subsidiaries initially.
When both countries conduct offshorable tasks and with a positive Southern learning effect, more
and increasingly sophisticated tasks are reallocated from the North to the South, with the North
concentrating on the high-end tasks and non-offshorable activities. Countries and firms move up
the global value chain, as the Southern subsidiaries do more and harder tasks, and the Northern
counterparts do fewer but more complex tasks. Meanwhile, the number of varieties increases and
displays a converging pattern of growth. The expansion at the extensive margin serves as the main
source of welfare gains for both countries.
What is interesting here is that with non-offshorable activities being necessary and costly for
firms, under certain circumstances, the North may not be participating in any offshorable tasks.
Rather, all these tasks are offshored to the South. In this situation, if the Southern subsidiaries
have opportunities to learn through conducting tasks beyond their technological capabilities, both
countries may be better off over time in terms of consumer welfare.
The autarky situation and dynamic gains from offshoring are examined in this chapter. The
gains from offshoring, compared with autarky, can be decomposed into two effects: 1) the variety
4effect (the extensive margin), with the number of varieties enjoyed by consumers being different
from the autarky case, and 2) the consumption effect (the intensive margin), with the per-brand
consumption level being changed. The interaction between the two effects determines the national
welfare gains from offshoring. It is found that the variety effect is constantly positive for both
countries, while the consumption effect is not definitely constantly positive. Combining both effects,
different from the situation under perfect competition discussed in the basic model, the developing
country here may experience a short-run welfare loss upon participating in global production.
However, in the long run, the learning effect will lead the South to be better off than its autarky
situation. Meanwhile, the North enjoys a higher welfare level since the beginning of joining global
production, and the gain continues in the long-run. Therefore, although both types of countries
will be rewarded from joining the multinational production chain, the paths can be quite different.
1.3 Moving Up the Global Value Chain: Evidence from China
A central prediction of the theories is that global production converges to a steady state where
no further offshoring occurs. During this evolution process, the national contribution of industrial
value-added is dynamically redistributed between countries – the Southern part increases while
the Northern part decreases, and the speed of redistribution declines over time. ”Moving up the
global value chain” thus translates into an increasing Southern share of value added in total value
of industrial output over time, while the speed of growth declines gradually.
An empirical approach is thus applied to examine the dynamics of Southern share of total
value-added in Chapter 5, and it can be applied to firm-level data from any developing host country.
In the approach, multinational subsidiaries in a Southern country are grouped into industries that
are considered as multinational industries, and multinational subsidiaries themselves are viewed as
collections of tasks. A growth and convergence of the value-added ratio (VR, value-added divided
by total value) of multinational industries would support the theoretical predictions on value-added
share dynamics.
Subsidiaries are not weightless, and therefore their weights may drive industry-level VR
5to change even with no VR change within them. To determine whether the VR growth and
convergence of multinational industries are essentially driven by those of subsidiaries, I decompose
the VR change of each multinational industry into two margins – a within-subsidiary margin and a
cross-subsidiary margin, and examine whether each of the two margins, as well as the industry-level
VR change itself, is converging. Using this approach, I examine subsidiary-level data on China’s
multinational operation over ten years (1998-2007). Convergence is found at the industry level,
and it is primarily driven by the within-subsidiary margin, which is consistent with the theory.
1.4 Innovation in the Home Country: An Extension
The reshoring phenomenon has been rising recently: production capacities and facilities start
returning to developed countries from developing countries where they were previously offshored.
One important motivation behind this trend is that developed countries’ advantages in production
efficiency are able to offset their disadvantages in factor prices. One of the essential reasons here
is that the Northern countries keep innovating on production technologies, which outpaces the
corresponding improvements taking place in the South. In Chapter 6, I incorporate the important
factor of technology improvement – innovation – into the analysis framework of global value chain.
With technology progresses in both countries – innovation in the North and learning in
the South, the interaction between the pace of innovation and that of learning determines the
organization dynamics of global production. The model provides predictions and explanations for
the dynamics of offshoring and reshoring. Both offshoring expansion and reshoring are possible
under this enriched framework, depending upon how the countries’ relative production efficiency
may change over time.
Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
This chapter presents an overview of the existing research on global production and value
chain, from the perspective of international trade. The literature has helped shape the theoretical
and empirical position developed in this study, and it serves as a lens through which to view this
research in a comprehensive contextual framework. Contributions of this research to the literature
are thus discussed accordingly in this chapter.
There is a growing literature on multinational production that views global integration as
increasingly marked by task trade, and the global chain of production is thus modeled as a collection
of offshorable tasks or a continuum of stages of production. Early examples include Dixit and
Grossman (1982) and Feenstra and Hanson (1996b, 1997).1 More recent works further explore
issues such as the effects of heterogeneous offshoring costs (e.g., Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg,
2008, 2012), the optimal allocation of ownership rights along the value chain (e.g., Antra`s and Chor,
2013), and the influence of technological change on the interdependence of countries participating
in the global supply chain (e.g., Costinot et al., 2013).2 Sharing with this body of literature that
global production is considered and analyzed in a task-based framework, I formulate the dynamic
theoretical framework of global value chain in this study, in which the location of value added
and task trade are endogenously determined. As discussed in the literature, there are various
configurations of production processes, such as the “spider” and “snake” described in Baldwin and
1 Other early related works such as Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977, 1980) have studied trade theories
based on a continuum of tradable goods.
2 Other important task- or stage-based works include Carluccio and Fally (2013), Yi (2003), Baldwin and Venables
(2013), and Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2014).
7Venables (2013), and studies on production-chain issues often assume that tasks and/or stages
of production are sequential in nature (e.g., Costinot et al., 2013 and Antra`s and Chor, 2013).
As models assuming task sequentiality provide sharp insights into the production-chain issues,
particularly for the “snake” type of production process, it is desirable that the global production and
value chain be understood and interpreted in a generalized way, without depending on any particular
pattern of production process. To capture this idea, my models set no specific requirement for the
sequence of task- or stage-completion, with tasks being ranked by their degree of technological
sophistication in the framework.3 Thus, the specific organization pattern of a production process
is less a concern when using the framework presented in this study to examine and explain value-
chain issues.
The theoretical framework presented in this study features the critical role of dynamic
learning-by-doing in the production process, and it provides rich descriptions on how global pro-
duction may evolve and the resulted dynamic effects of this process on various economic aspects.
In the existing literature, learning-by-doing has long been viewed as a central driver for growth
and upgrading at various economic levels. Since Arrow (1962) incorporated learning-by-doing into
the endogenous growth theory, this topic has generated a rich literature in various economic fields.
Theoretically, it plays an important role in examining the mechanics of economic growth and devel-
opment in many fields, including international trade.4 Empirical studies have also found support
for it being an important driver of growth.5 This study contributes to this body of literature by
incorporating learning-by-doing into the task-based production and offshoring models, examining
the effects of learning on the dynamics of global production pattern across countries. Particularly,
it addresses what countries and firms can do in order to learn and thus move along the global value
chain. Understanding these essential factors and the mechanism involved is important, since they
are critical in explaining why some countries experience rapid growth and industrialization within
3 Similar rankings/categorizations of tasks as presented in my model are discussed in Costinot et al. (2011),
Oldenski (2012), and Keller and Yeaple (2013), but their studies focus on different issues than those examined in this
study.
4 See, for example, Krugman (1987), Lucas (1988, 1993), Stokey (1988), Young (1991), Matsuyama (1992) and
Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996).
5 See, for example, Bahk and Gort (1993), Irwin and Klenow (1994), and Levitt et al. (2012).
8the global production network, while some other otherwise similar countries do not. As mentioned
in Young (1991), learning-by-doing could be conceived of as the exploration and actualization of
advanced technologies, which may be new to a country. This study largely agrees with this idea –
in the models presented in this study, it is by conducting the tasks for which there is a technological
gap between countries that the technologically less advanced country can learn and thus improve
its production efficiency over time. This improvement further enables the offshoring pattern to
evolve gradually. Therefore, the theory fundamentally examines the dynamics of global production
through the endogenous exploration of technologies.
Based on the task-based production framework, this study further examines the welfare dy-
namics of participating in the global production network. There is a long list of studies that have
explored the effects of production fragmentation and offshoring on welfare issues. The arguments
and results are mixed. Production globalization can bring positive or negative welfare results to
countries under different conditions.6 As indicated in the literature, production fragmentation has
different effects on countries’ welfare, probably working in opposite directions.7 In this study, I focus
primarily on the dynamics of welfare effects – whether countries experience welfare improvement as
global production evolves, what the welfare effects are, and how countries’ welfare evolution paths
may be. These issues are carefully examined within different competition environments and under
different other conditions. The discussions contribute to the existing literature in that they present
the evolution of welfare resulted from learning with production fragmentation and offshoring. They
address the question of whether trade in tasks is beneficial for countries dynamically, particularly
for developing countries. In this study, evolutions in offshoring naturally translate into world in-
come redistributions. Over time, the national contribution of value-added as well as the national
share of world income is dynamically redistributed between the two sets of countries – the Southern
6 See, for example, Arkolakis et al. (2012), Arkolakis et al. (2013), Burstein and Monge-Naranjo (2009), Lindert
and Williamson (2007), Markusen (1984), Markusen and Venables (1998), Ramondo and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2013),
Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2010), Garetto (2013).
7 For example, in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), fragmentation has three main effects on low-skill wages,
including the productivity effect, the relative-price effect, and the labor-supply effect. In Rodr´ıguez-Clare (2010),
another set of effects – a productivity effect, a terms-of-trade effect, and a world-efficiency effect – is discussed.
Depending upon the interactions among separate effects, countries may see different aggregate welfare effects of
offshoring.
9part increases while the Northern part declines, and the speed of redistribution decreases gradually.
Through task trade and with learning, developing countries benefit dynamically while they partici-
pate in global production. At the same time, the developed countries can also be better off, but the
path is different. Therefore, while classical trade theories such as Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin
models have argued the static positive gains from openness, and later studies looking at dynamic
stories find possible negative effects over time (e.g., Matsuyama, 1992, Redding, 1999 and Stokey,
1991), this research provides a different perspective to understand the welfare dynamics which
yields interesting results.
A main prediction from the theoretical models is that when global production converges to its
steady state where no further offshoring happens, the Southern value-added portion also converges,
and it essentially maps the convergence pattern of task-offshoring during the process. Therefore,
the theory offers a convenient prediction as to how the South’s share of value added in an industry
should behave over time: “moving up the global value chain” translates into an increasing Southern
share of value added in total value of industrial output over time, while the speed of moving up
declines gradually.
A micro-founded approach is applied in this study to examine the dynamics of the value-
added ratio (VR) of global production contributed by the South (i.e., the South’s share of value
added). By using a dataset on China’s multinational subsidiaries spanning 10 years, the evolution
pattern of industry-level VR is examined. This practice is related to the broad empirical litera-
ture investigating vertical specialization and value-added trade across countries (e.g., Alfaro and
Charlton, 2009, Hummels et al., 2001 and Johnson and Noguera, 2012). As documented by these
studies, the global production chain has been increasingly sliced up, and vertical specialization is
deepening. The work presented here moves one step further – to note the dynamics of Southern
contribution during this process. With regard to country choice, there have been many empirical
studies examining China’s position in the global production network and its change over time. The
findings include that the sophistication of China’s exports has been rising (e.g., Schott, 2008, Xu
and Lu, 2009, Wang and Wei, 2010 and Jarreau and Poncet, 2012) and that the domestic content
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in China’s exports has been increasing (e.g., Koopman et al., 2012 and Kee and Tang, 2013) in
recent years. In this study, the results of the empirical examination share the idea with this liter-
ature that China has been improving its situation in the global economic environment, but from
the perspective of its contribution to the world’s production and offshoring network. By further
decomposing the aggregate VR change into a within-subsidiary margin and a cross-subsidiary mar-
gin, the empirical works further contribute that it is the changes that happen within subsidiaries
that mainly drive the overall industry-level VR dynamics.
Chapter 3
A Dynamic Theory of Global Production: A Task-Based Perspective
As noted in Chapter 1, various phenomena have been documented as “moving up the global
value chain,” however, while we may have a common sense of what the phrase means, questions
arise when we attempt to ponder it thoroughly. What is the argument variable of the chain? Who
is on the chain? How does a player move along the chain? Why do countries at quite different
development stages all claim that they move up the global value chain at the same time? Such
questions need to be answered when we try to understand the story better.
This chapter is among the first attempts to provide a unified theoretical framework to address
the meaning and mechanism of the dynamics of global production and value chain. It is from the
perspective of cross-border task allocation of multinational production. The model introduced in
this chapter is task-based, with the global production process being considered as a spectrum of
tasks ranked by their degree of technological sophistication. The global production and value chain
of an industry is then described as a sequence of tasks that may be fragmented and spread across
countries, with each task adding value to the final industrial product.1 In this basic model, firms
operate in a perfectly competitive environment, which provides basic benchmark analyses.
The model features the role of learning-by-doing so that developing countries may improve
their production efficiency over time, which then drives the organization pattern of global pro-
duction to evolve. While countries participating in multinational production typically specialize in
different sets of activities, being involved in the global production network provides the participants
1 Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) had a similar definition for tasks, while in their model, tasks differ in
offshoring cost, and they looked at the static task specialization pattern and related it to relative wages and outputs.
12
with opportunities to get contact with foreign technologies. This allows them to learn from others
with advanced technologies and to accumulate technical experience through conducting activities
they specialize in. Over time, this process enables countries to develop capabilities of carrying out
more sophisticated activities in a more efficient way.
Typically, multinational operations in developing countries (the South) start from perform-
ing tasks that are relatively simple (e.g., assembly and packaging), while those in developed coun-
tries (the North) concentrate their efforts on sophisticated activities (e.g., engineering and product
design). Due to low factor prices, the Southern operations may acquire activities beyond their
technological capability to carry out. The efficiency gap between the South and the North on these
“beyond” tasks enables the former to improve on its production technologies by learning from the
latter. This learning-by-doing effect thus leads to more sophisticated tasks being relocated from
the North to the South. Over time, the Southern coverage of tasks in global production expands,
while the Northern coverage, although narrower over time, concentrates on the most sophisticated
activities. Thus, both types of countries experience upgrading along the global production chain.
Following discussions on task-offshoring dynamics, this chapter moves on to analyze the
welfare dynamics. As global production converges to its long-run steady state, the South becomes
increasingly better off, while the North may experience a “hump-shaped” path of welfare dynamics.
I further examine the effect of participating in global production on countries’ welfare, i.e., whether
establishing the global production network is beneficial for different types of countries. Within
the perfectly competitive environment, I find that engaging in offshoring benefits both types of
countries, with both seeing welfare gains at least in the short run.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, I introduce the main framework
of the basic perfect-competition task-based model of global production. Section 3.2 studies the
instantaneous equilibrium of the model and the long-run steady state of multinational production.
The dynamics of task offshoring are examined in Section 3.3. Discussions on the dynamics of
national welfare are presented in Section 3.4, and the gains from fragmentation and offshoring are
analyzed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 offers concluding remarks.
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3.1 Set-up of the Model
Consider a world comprised of two countries: North (N) and South (S). There is one indus-
try supplying a final consumption product Y to both countries, with no trade or shipping cost.
Consumer preferences in the two countries are identical. The environment is perfectly competitive.
Labor is the sole factor of production, and it is inelastically supplied and immobile across countries.
The labor endowment of country i is denoted by Li, which is constant over time. Time is continuous
and indexed by t.
3.1.1 Production
The production of final good Y requires a continuum of tasks to be completed, indexed by
z ∈ [0, 1]. The value of z indicates the technological sophistication of tasks – a larger z indicates a
more sophisticated task. The production of Y at any time t is expressed as:
lnY (t) =
∫ 1
0
lnx(z, t)dz, (3.1)
where x(z, t) is the amount of task z completed at time t. Each task can be carried out in either
country with constant returns to scale.
Consider the production technology. For any task z, there is a minimum unit labor require-
ment for completing it, which is given by
a¯(z) = a¯e−z, (3.2)
which is a time-invariant and non-increasing function of z.2
The North, on one side, has the most efficient technology for carrying out all tasks; i.e., it can
conduct any task using the minimum required amount of labor at any time. The South, on the other
side, possesses a stock of technologies initially at t = 0, but only those for low-sophistication tasks
are as good as their Northern corresponding ones. Specifically, the efficiency frontier of technology
in the South is denoted by T (t) at time t, with 0 < T (t) ≤ 1. At time t = 0, it is the case that
2 As in Young (1991), this assumption implies that the ultimate productivity of labor is non-decreasing in the
technological sophistication of task production.
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0 < T (0) < 1. For those simple tasks with z ≤ T (0), the South’s production technologies are as
efficient as the North’s. For the complicated ones with z > T (0), the Southern technologies are less
efficient, and the more sophisticated a task is, the further the South lags behind.3 Specifically,
the Southern unit labor requirement for conducting task z at t = 0 is given by
a(z, 0) =

a¯(z) = a¯e−z if z ≤ T (0) ,
a¯ez−2T (0) if z > T (0) .
(3.3)
3.1.2 Learning-by-Doing
Any task can be conducted in either country. Therefore, offshoring happens out of the cost-
minimization incentive – the South conducts tasks offshored from the North, starting from the
relatively simple ones, while the North carries out the sophisticated ones. The two countries thus
form a multinational production chain. The South may obtain certain offshored tasks beyond
its technological efficiency frontier because of its low factor price. By conducting these “beyond”
tasks, the South observes the technological gap between the two countries and thus may accumulate
experience and improve its own technologies, thereby enhancing its production efficiency. This is
the learning-by-doing effect within the South. Furthermore, it is assumed that the learning-by-
doing effect is bounded with spillovers across tasks, with the minimum unit labor requirement
schedule serving as the learning boundary. Therefore, the South experiences reduction in its unit
labor requirement over time:
∂a(·, t)/∂t
a(·, t) = −
∫ 1
0
2β
{
1
∣∣∣∣a(z, t)a¯(z) > 1
}
LS(z, t) dz , (3.4)
where
{
1
∣∣∣a(z,t)a¯(z) > 1} is an indicator function whose value equals 1 if the room for learning for task
z in the South is not exhausted at time t, and it equals 0 otherwise; LS(z, t) denotes the amount
of labor used for conducting task z in the South at time t; and β > 0 is a parameter that indicates
the learning ability of the South.4
3 The idea of technological distance has appeared in other models of learning. See, for example, Auerswald et al.
(2000), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), and Mitchell (2000).
4 The environment is built upon Young (1991), where a general form of the bounded learning-by-doing function
is provided.
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The learning function indicates first that the South is not able to learn from tasks that it is not
conducting. Secondly, for tasks that the South has already possessed the best technology, carrying
them out does not contribute to further efficiency improvement. Furthermore, the efficiency gain
from learning decreases in the Southern stock of advanced technology, as the situation a(z, t) = a¯(z)
becomes increasingly common when T (t) covers more tasks.
With the initial unit labor requirement schedule of the South and the learning-by-doing effect,
the unit labor requirement for conducting a task z in the South at time t follows
a(z, t) =

a¯(z) = a¯e−z , if z ≤ T (t) ,
a¯ez−2T (t) , if z > T (t) ,
(3.5)
where T (t) denotes the technology efficiency frontier of the South at time t. T (t) evolves following
dT (t)
dt
=
∫ 1
T (t)
βLS(z, t)dz . (3.6)
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of the unit labor requirement in the two countries.
Figure 3.1: Unit Labor Requirement Evolution with Learning-by-Doing in the South
0 1
Unit Labor 
Requirement
z
North
South at t = 0
South at t > 0
T(0) T(t)
In this basic model with perfectly competitive environment, tasks are undertaken with con-
stant returns to scale. Therefore, firms do not have a substantial role here from the theoretical
perspective.
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3.2 Instantaneous Equilibrium and Steady State of Multinational Production
3.2.1 Instantaneous Equilibrium
Let wi(t) denote the wage rate in coutry i at time t. Then the unit cost functions for
conducting any task z in the two countries are, respectively,
CS(wS(t), z) = wS(t)a(z, t) , (3.7)
CN (wN (t), z) = wN (t)a¯(z) . (3.8)
As described earlier, a certain range of tasks are offshored to the South, and the offshoring starts
from the simplest tasks, since the South has the most advanced technologies for them since the
initial time. Thus, the cost conditions (3.7) and (3.8) combine to form a no-arbitrage condition in
task offshoring, indicating the pattern of task allocation between the two countries. There exists a
threshold task z¯(t) at time t such that CS(wS(t), z) = CN (wN (t), z) in equilibrium, i.e.,
wS(t) a(z¯(t), t) = wN (t) a¯(z¯(t)) , (3.9)
where z¯(t) is the most sophisticated task that is performed in the South. Thus, this threshold
task z¯(t) indicates the pattern of multinational production and countries’ respective position on
the global production chain – the South is at a “lower” position on the chain by carrying out tasks
with z ∈ [0, z¯(t)], while the North is at a “higher” position concentrating on the high-end tasks
with z ∈ (z¯(t), 1]. Certainly, one essential condition that enables offshoring is with regard to the
factor price: wS(t) ≤ wN (t). I will show that this condition is fully satisfied in later discussions.
The labor-market clearing conditions for the two countries at time t are given by
South :
∫ z¯(t)
0
xS(z, t)a(z, t)dz = LS , (3.10)
North :
∫ 1
z¯(t)
xN (z, t)a¯(z)dz = LN , (3.11)
where xi(z, t) denotes the amount of task z conducted in country i at time t.
With the task-based production function (3.1), each task receives the same share of the world
expenditure. The price of each task equals the minimum of its unit completion costs in the two
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countries. Let E(t) denote the world expenditure on the final product Y at time t, defined as the
sum of factor payments in the two economies:
E(t) = wS(t)LS + wN (t)LN . (3.12)
Then the demand for a task z conducted in country i at time t is given by
xi(z, t) =
E(t)
Ci(wi(t), z)
, i ∈ {N,S} . (3.13)
With the unit cost functions (3.7) and (3.8), along with (3.13), the labor-market clearing
conditions boil down to
South :
∫ z¯(t)
0
E(t)
wS(t)
dz = LS , (3.10
′)
North :
∫ 1
z¯(t)
E(t)
wN (t)
dz = LN . (3.11
′)
Therefore, the instantaneous equilibrium of the model at any time t is characterized by the
offshoring threshold determination condition (3.9), the labor-market clearing conditions (3.10′)
and (3.11′), and the world expenditure function (3.12). One equilibrium equation here can be
dropped by Walras’ Law, so that one variable can be chosen as numeraire. I thus normalize world
expenditure at unity: E(t) = 1, and hereby wage rates are measured as a share of the total world
factor income.
3.2.2 Steady State
From examining the instantaneous equilibrium conditions described above, it is found that
there exists a threshold task z∗ such that if it serves as the offshoring threshold under the equilibrium
conditions – all tasks with z ∈ [0, z∗] are offshored to the South, and all tasks with z ∈ (z∗, 1] are
conducted in the North, wage rates in the two countries are equalized. From conditions (3.10′) and
(3.11′), this wage-equalization task threshold z∗ is solved as
z∗ =
LS
LS + LN
. (3.14)
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This task z∗ serves as the steady state of offshoring in this basic model.5 At the steady
state, the multinational production organization pattern is stable, with no more offshoring changes
happening. Other aspects of the economies, such as wage rates and production of the final good,
are also thus stabilized. Particularly, when multinational production arrives at the steady state,
all tasks are conducted using the most advanced technologies.
3.3 Transition Dynamics of Task Offshoring
Countries’ initial stocks of technology and their factor endowments determine their initial
positions on the global production chain, which then further determine their development there-
after. A relatively capable developing country may not see much space for learning thus efficiency
improvement by taking part in multinational production, while a factor-abundant country with
technologies lagging far behind may find great learning potential and opportunities. In this sec-
tion, I examine the transition dynamics of task offshoring under different circumstances, i.e., how
task-allocation across countries evolves over time with the learning-by-doing effect.
3.3.1 Transition Dynamics of Task Offshoring with an Initially Efficient South
In this situation, the South is relatively capable in terms of production technology initially:
T (0) ≥ z∗. Thus, it is easy to tell that all low-sophistication tasks below z∗ will be offshored
to the South, in order to fully exploit the cost advantages. All the offshored tasks thus may
be conducted using the best technologies. Given the unit labor requirement schedules and the
equilibrium conditions, the initial equilibrium is characterized by the following:
wS(0) a¯e
−z¯(0) = wN (0) a¯e−z¯(0) , (3.15)∫ z¯(0)
0
1
wS(0)
dz = LS , (3.16)∫ 1
z¯(0)
1
wN (0)
dz = LN . (3.17)
5 From here on, all notations with the superscript “∗” stand for corresponding variables at the long-run steady
state.
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These conditions indicate that at t = 0, the task offshoring threshold, z¯(0), and wage rates are
given by, respectively,
z¯(0) = z∗ =
LS
LS + LN
, (3.18)
wS(0) = wN (0) = w
∗ =
1
LS + LN
. (3.19)
Therefore, for all the tasks offshored to the South, the country’s technology is as good as the North’s
– the South does not conduct anything that it is not good at. This implies that there is no learning
space for further improvement in the South. From the learning function (3.4), ∂a(·,t)/∂ta(·,t) = 0. As a
consequence, over time, the Southern unit labor requirement schedule keeps the same as that at
t = 0, and the Southern technology stock does not change over time (T (t) = T (0), ∀t). Given
that production efficiency stays unchanged in both countries, for all following time periods, the
equilibrium will also be the same as the initial one:
z¯(t) = z∗ =
LS
LS + LN
, ∀t (3.18′)
wS(t) = wN (t) = w
∗ =
1
LS + LN
, ∀t. (3.19′)
Multinational production in this case thus arrives at its long-run steady state at the beginning.
Figure 3.2 displays this essentially static equilibrium situation in this case.
3.3.2 Transition Dynamics of Task Offshoring with Learning-by-Doing
In multinational production, most developing countries have enough labor resource but lack
advanced technologies. This situation may be modeled as T (0) < z∗. It is the main focus of this
basic model, and the task offshoring dynamics in this case are examined in this section.
Given that T (0) < z∗, z¯(0) ∈ (T (0), z∗) follows. The reasons are that an offshoring threshold
right at T (0) is not cost-minimizing and that without the best technologies for tasks beyond T (0),
it is costly to conduct all tasks [0, z∗] in the South in the initial time period. From (3.2), (3.3),
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Figure 3.2: Dynamics of Task Offshoring: an Initially Efficient South (T (0) ≥ z∗)
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T(t) = T(0)z(t) = z*
(3.9), (3.10′) and (3.11′), the initial equilibrium (t = 0) then is characterized by
wS(0) × a¯ez¯(0)−2T (0) = wN (0) × a¯e−z¯(0) , (3.20)∫ z¯(0)
0
1
wS(0)
dz = LS , (3.21)∫ 1
z¯(0)
1
wN (0)
dz = LN . (3.22)
By examining the equilibrium conditions, the initial offshoring threshold, z¯(0), and wage rates are
found to be determined by the following conditions:
e2z¯(0)−2T (0) =
1− z¯(0)
z¯(0)
× LS
LN
, (3.23)
wS(0) =
z¯(0)
LS
, (3.24)
wN (0) =
1− z¯(0)
LN
. (3.25)
At the equilibrium, with z¯(0) < z∗ = LSLS+LN , it is the case that wS(0) <
1
LS+LN
< wN (0). The
relatively low factor price in the South enables the offshoring to happen, ensuring that the simple
tasks for which the South has the best technologies may be offshored. Furthermore, except for
these simple tasks, the South also obtains tasks beyond its technological capability to carry out
(z¯(0) > T (0)). Figure 3.3 shows the initial equilibrium of this situation.
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Figure 3.3: Initial Task Offshoring: an Initially Inefficient South (z∗ > T (0))
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T(0) z(0) z*
By conducting the “beyond” tasks, the learning-by-doing effect is turned on. From the
learning function (3.4), it can be told that ∂a(·,t)/∂ta(·,t) > 0. The South thus will experience production-
efficiency improvement over time, which will further attract more tasks to be offshored. At time t,
the instantaneous equilibrium is characterized by
e2z¯(t)−2T (t) =
1− z¯(t)
z¯(t)
× LS
LN
, (3.26)
wS(t) =
z¯(t)
LS
, (3.27)
wN (t) =
1− z¯(t)
LN
. (3.28)
Following the same reasoning as discussed earlier, as long as T (t) < z∗, it is always the case that the
task-offshoring threshold lies between the Southern technology stock and the long-run steady state:
z¯(t) ∈ (T (t), z∗)), which enables the South to further accumulate experience and learn. During
this process, the Southern wage rate is always lower than the Northern wage level: wS(t) < wN (t).
The positive learning-by-doing effect present in the South is reflected by the accumulation of
technology there – T (t) evolves according to the technology accumulation path:6
dT (t)
dt
= βLS × z¯(t)− T (t)
z¯(t)
. (3.29)
6 See Appendix A.1.1 for the derivation of (3.29).
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The learning effect indicates that as long as the South conducts tasks beyond its current technology
stock, the country may always learn from what it does, i.e., dT (t)dt > 0 when z¯(t) > T (t).
The learning effect then further pushes the offshoring threshold toward more complicated
activities. The production efficiency improvement in the developing country makes more tasks, also
the relatively more sophisticated ones, be relocated there from the developed country. Therefore,
the South climbs up the global value chain by expanding its task scope and doing increasingly
sophisticated tasks as well. This can be seen by examining (3.26):
dz¯(t)
dt
=
2z¯(t) (1− z¯(t))
1 + 2z¯(t) (1− z¯(t)) ×
dT (t)
dt
, (3.30)
which further implies that
0 <
dz¯(t)
dt
<
dT (t)
dt
, (3.31)
during the process of Southern learning (i.e., dT (t)dt > 0). At the same time, by increasingly offshoring
tasks to the South, the North more and more focuses on the most difficult activities. Although the
range of tasks that are performed in the North narrows over time, the average task sophistication
increases. Therefore, the developed country also moves up the global value chain in this sense.
Moving up the multinational value chain is thus given a specific definition as an upgrading in the
set of tasks that a country conducts.
Then the question comes to how strong the learning effect is and whether it diminishes
over time. From (3.29), the learning space on “beyond” tasks – the distance between z¯(t) and T (t)
relative to the whole range of offshored tasks z¯(t) – largely determines the strength of learning effect.
As time passes, the speed of technology accumulation exceeds the speed of offshoring expansion (i.e,
dT (t)
dt >
dz¯(t)
dt > 0), and thus the learning opportunities will be gradually exhausted. This indicates
that the offshoring threshold, as well as the technology stock in the South, will evolve over time
following a concaved-shaped path:7
d2T (t)
dt2
< 0, and
d2z¯(t)
dt2
< 0 . (3.32)
7 See Appendix A.1.1 and Appendix A.1.2 for the derivation.
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In the long run, the offshoring threshold, z¯(t), and the Southern technology stock, T (t),
converge to the same steady state z∗.8 Therefore, for all tasks that are offshored to the South,
the country will be having the best technologies for them in the long run. All the tasks, no matter
conducted in which country, will then be carried out with the best technologies available. Figure 3.4
shows the convergence paths for both the Southern technology stock T (t) and the task offshoring
threshold z¯(t).
Figure 3.4: Dynamics of Task Offshoring: an Initially Inefficient South (z∗ > T (0))
0
z(t)
T(t)
t
z*
3.4 Dynamics of National Welfare and Gains from Offshoring
In this section, two important questions are examined: (1) during the process of offshoring
evolution, how will the countries’ welfare change over time? and (2) do countries gain from pro-
duction fragmentation and offshoring? For both questions, answers under the first situation – the
static equilibrium with a sufficiently efficient South – can be easily understood once the dynamics
under the second case are illustrated. Therefore, I will mainly focus on the dynamic case here.
8 Given (3.26), (3.29) and (3.30), together with the value of z∗ shown in (3.14), it is easy to verify that when
z¯(t) = z∗, both dT (t)
dt
and dz¯(t)
dt
decrease to 0.
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3.4.1 Dynamics of Wage Rates
From the wage determination functions (3.27) and (3.28), it is easy to tell that the dynamics
of wage rate in both countries are determined by that of the task offshoring threshold z¯(t). Given
the discussions on offshoring dynamics in Section 3.3.2, it is found that wage rate in the South,
wS(t), follows a similar growth path like that of z¯(t) – increasing over time at a decreasing speed. In
contrast, the Northern wage rate, wN (t), decreases over time. What is noteworthy here is that both
wage rates are essentially measured as a share of the total world expenditure, which is normalized
to unity. Thus, the share of world income that each country takes follows a distinct evolution path.
Before multinational production reaches its long-run steady state, the Southern wage rate is
always lower than the Northern wage: wS(t) < wN (t), while both are approaching their common
steady state, w∗ = 1LS+LN , during the process. Figure 3.5 illustrates the evolution paths of the
wage rates in the two countries.
Figure 3.5: Dynamics of Wage Rates with Learning-by-Doing
0 t
w*
wN(t)
wS(t)
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3.4.2 Dynamics of Output
As offshoring evolves, at any point of time t, the world output amount of the consumer
product is9
Y (t) =
LN
a¯(1− z¯(t)) × e
z¯(t)2−T (t)2 × e 12 . (3.33)
Examining the output function, it is found that the world output displays also a concave-shaped
growth path over time:10
dY (t)
dt
= Y (t)× 2[z¯(t)− T (t)]dT (t)
dt
> 0, when 0 < T (t) < z¯(t) < 1, (3.34)
d2Y (t)
dt2
< 0, when 0 < T (t) < z¯(t) < 1 . (3.35)
Therefore, when more and more tasks are reallocated from the North to the South, the total world
output grows over time. While the learning space is increasingly exhausted during the process,
the growth rate of output declines gradually. In the long run, the output amount converges to its
steady state:11
Y ∗ =
(
LS + LN
a¯
)
e
1
2 . (3.36)
Figure 3.6 shows the growth pattern of output over time.
3.4.3 Dynamics of National Welfare
As discussed in Section 3.4.2, the world output increases over time. As a whole, the world
gains as the total consumption level increases. At the same time, wage rates in the two countries
show different evolution patterns – the South experiences a positive-sloping path, while the Northern
share of world income shrinks. Hence, the question arises as to whether the two countries’ respective
welfare grows as the learning process continues. Assuming no trade or shipping cost, within the
perfectly competitive environment, the consumer price of the final product is the same across
countries. The price index of the final good at time t is P (t) = 1Y (t) . Then the countries’ welfare
9 See Appendix A.2.1 for the derivation.
10 See Apeendix A.2.1 for the derivation.
11 It is easy to obtain the steady state of output with (3.14) and the output expression (3.33).
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Figure 3.6: Dynamics of Output with Learning-by-Doing
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levels measured by consumption are given by
South : ωS(t) =
wS(t)LS
P (t)
= z¯(t)Y (t) , (3.37)
North : ωN (t) =
wN (t)LN
P (t)
= (1− z¯(t))Y (t) . (3.38)
3.4.3.1 Welfare Analysis for the South
For the South, as learning continues, the country keeps getting more tasks to conduct thus
obtains an increasing share of world income for consumption. The world output also increases over
time. With the two positive effects, the South enjoys a rising welfare over time:
dωS(t)
dt
= z¯(t)
dY (t)
dt
+ Y (t)
dz¯(t)
dt
> 0, when 0 < T (t) < z¯(t) < 1 . (3.39)
The growth rate of Southern welfare declines as it moves to the long-run steady state:12
d2ωS(t)
dt2
< 0, when 0 < T (t) < z¯(t) < 1 . (3.40)
Therefore, as shown in Figure 3.7, the Southern national welfare displays also a concave-
12 See Appendix A.2.2 for derivation.
27
shaped growth path, with the steady state reached in the long run, which is13
ω∗S =
(
LS
a¯
)
e
1
2 . (3.41)
Figure 3.7: Dynamics of Southern Welfare with Learning-by-Doing
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3.4.3.2 Welfare Analysis for the North
Different from the case of the South, for the North, although the world output grows over
time, the country’s share of the world income declines as offshoring deepens. The two forces work
in opposite directions. Examining the Northern welfare growth rate, dωN (t)dt , obtained from (3.38),
it is found that there exists a cut-off value z˜N which is the turning point of the Northern welfare
growth. When the offshoring threshold is at z˜N ,
dωN (t)
dt = 0. When less than z˜N tasks are offshored,
dωN (t)
dt > 0 – the North experiences a growth in welfare while offshoring is at relatively initial stages.
When more than z˜N tasks are offshored, the North starts to see declines in terms of consumption
(dωN (t)dt < 0).
14 Furthermore, it is easy to verify that z˜N < z
∗, and thus the North will experience a
welfare decline while multinational production is at the latest stages of approaching its steady state.
13 It is easy to obtain the steady state value from (3.14), (3.36) and (3.37)
14 See Appendix A.2.3 for proof.
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Intuitively, when close to the steady state, the learning space is almost exhausted – the negative
income-share effect thus outweighs the positive productivity effect stemming from learning. At the
steady state, the Northern long-run welfare is
ω∗N =
(
LN
a¯
)
e
1
2 . (3.42)
Comparing the long-run with the initial state of Northern welfare, ω∗N and ωN (0), it is found that
ω∗N
ωN (0)
= eT (0)
2−z¯(0)2 < 1 , (3.43)
which indicates that the long-run steady-state welfare of the North will actually be lower than its
initial state when it just starts offshoring. How big the gap is depends on the initial learning space
in the host country. Therefore, in sum, the evolution path of Northern welfare essentially depends
on the two countries’ relative endowments and the initial technology stocks.
Figure 3.8 illustrates two possible cases of Northern welfare evolution. In Panel A, the initial
offshoring threshold z¯(0) < z˜N . The North thus experiences welfare growth first while the efficiency
gain brought by Southern learning outweighs the income effect. The situation will reverse later after
more than z˜N tasks are offshored. This case is more likely to happen when the South is adequately
abundant in labor (a large LS thus a high z˜N ) and/or has a low technology stock initially (a low
T (0) thus a low z¯(0)). In Panel B, more than z˜N tasks are offshored at the beginning. Over time,
the North sees declining welfare until it reaches the steady state. This is more likely the case if the
South has a small labor force and/or possesses relatively high stock of technology initially. From
the short-run perspective of the North, it may be beneficial to form the multinational production
chain when the host country is large and/or lagging far behind in terms of production efficiency, so
that the North can enjoy welfare growth at least in the short run. In contrast, from the long-run
perspective, it may be better if the South is a “balanced” economy – the technology stock and the
factor endowment are balanced, so that the initial offshoring threshold does not deviate too much
from the technology stock in the host country.
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Figure 3.8: Dynamics of Northern Welfare with Learning-by-Doing
(a) Panel A: A Low Initial Offshoring Threshold: z¯(0) < z˜N
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3.5 Gains from Offshoring
An important issue comes to whether countries gain from joining the multinational production
chain, i.e., whether engaging in offshoring may benefit final consumers in different countries. In
this section, I first present welfare under autarky for the two countries respectively. Then I move
on to compare welfare levels under autarky vs. under offshoring, both for the short-run and for the
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long-run, which leads to the discussions on gains from offshoring. As mentioned earlier, the static
case of offshoring can essentially be viewed as a sub-case of the dynamic situation. Therefore, in
this section, the main discussions are on the dynamic situation with a positive learning effect.
3.5.1 Welfare under Autarky
Under autarky, both countries have to conduct all tasks to produce the final product according
to (3.1). They start with the same situation as t = 0 under offshoring – the productivity schedules
are given by (3.2) and (3.3), for the North and South, respectively. Without offshoring, countries are
not able to get touch with foreign technologies, which indicates that there is no learning opportunity
for the South. Therefore, the two economies will stay the same as where they start initially – the
time index t can thus be omitted for the autarky case.15
With full employment, the amount of task z conducted in a country can be expressed as
South : xAS (z) =
LS
a(z, t)
, (3.44)
North : xAN (z) =
LN
a¯(z)
. (3.45)
This further indicates that the final output level, which is also the real consumption thus implies
a country’s welfare under autarky, is given by16
South : ωAS = Y
A
S =
LS
a¯
× e−[T (0)−1]2+ 12 , (3.46)
North : ωAN = Y
A
N =
LN
a¯
× e 12 . (3.47)
3.5.2 Gains from Offshoring with Learning-by-Doing
Given the autarky welfare levels, in this section, I discuss the gains from offshoring with the
learning-by-doing effect turned on. With learning, the economies evolve over time – the welfare
discussions will include both short-run and long-run analyses, i.e., whether countries gain when
15 The time index will be omitted hereby in this subsection, and the superscript “A” indicates the corresponding
variables under autarky.
16 The equations are easy to obtain given the production function (3.1) and the task amount expressions (3.44)
and (3.45).
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they just start participating in offshoring and whether they gain when they reach the steady state
in the long run.
Initial Gains Comparing the autarky case and the offshoring-with-learning case, it is
found that offshoring brings both countries higher welfare levels initially when they just open to
form the multinational production chain:17
ωS(0)
ωAS
= e(z¯(0)−1)
2
> 1 , and (3.48)
ωN (0)
ωAN
= ez¯(0)
2−T (0)2 > 1 . (3.49)
This result shows that in the short run, offshoring is beneficial for both countries with advanced
technologies and those lagging behind. Under multinational production, countries gain initially
from specializing in distinct sets of activities. However, the initial gains may be unbalanced between
countries – a large South, thus a high task offshoring threshold z¯(0), brings more welfare gains to
the North, than a small South, while a small South will self-benefit more.
Gains in the Long Run As discussed in Section 3.4, the South experiences continuous
welfare improvement when offshoring evolves over time. Therefore, it is easy to see that when t > 0,
the South is always better off than under autarky when multinational production progresses. In
the long run, it is the case that
ω∗S
ωAS
= e(T (0)−1)
2
> 1 (3.50)
For the North, it has been seen that its national welfare may show different possible paths
of evolution. Comparing the autarky welfare vs. the welfare under offshoring, it is found that
ωN (t) > ω
A
N before the economy reaches the steady state.
18 In the long run, ω∗N = ω
A
N . Hence,
the consumers in the North are also better off under multinational production during the evolution
process. In sum, with the Southern learning effect, both the technologically advanced and less
advanced countries may gain. While the short-run gain is positive for both, the long-run gain at
17 The countries’ initial welfare levels under offshoring are from (3.37) and (3.38), together with (3.33), while t = 0.
The comparison results are then easily obtained by comparing the welfare levels under offshoring vs. under autarky,
with condition (3.23) applied.
18 ωN (t)
ωA
N
= ez¯(t)
2−T (t)2 > 1 before arriving at steady state.
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the steady state is mainly for the South.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
A task-based model of multinational production dynamics with learning-by-doing is capable
of accounting for the evidences that both the developed and developing economies experience task
upgrading over time. To a certain extent, this basic perfect-competition story coincides with the
industrialization and growth experience of many countries. The model shows that host countries,
although lagging behind in terms of production efficiency, obtain an increasingly wide range of
relatively sophisticated activities to carry out over time. They also see increases in their share of
world income and consumption. This suggests the progress of foreign-direct-investment-led indus-
trialization observed in many countries. For the developed countries, they increasingly concentrate
efforts on the most complicated activities, as also seen in the real world.
The dynamics of welfare in this model show that taking part in multinational production is
favorable for both types of participants. Both countries are better off than under autarky since the
very beginning when they are engaged in offshoring. This situation continues during the evolution
process. In the long run, the South definitely enjoys a better welfare at the steady state than the
autarky case, while the North is at least as well off as its autarky level. Therefore, both countries
benefit from opening to offshoring.
Certainly, the perfect-competition framework discussed in this chapter provides a convenient
environment for analysis, while it leaves out certain factors such as the consideration of final
product’s varieties. In later chapters, the model under different frameworks will be examined and
thus provide additional insights into the dynamics of global value chain.
Chapter 4
The Dynamics of Global Value Chain in Monopolistic Competition
This chapter provides a theory of global value chain dynamics in the monopolistic competition
framework. In the model, there is one industry supplying a differentiated final consumer product.
Within the industry, there is a continuum of multinational firms, with each producing a single
and distinct variety and selling it in both countries. The multinational firms have subsidiaries in
both the developed and developing countries, with subsidiaries in different countries specializing in
different sets of activities.
Similar like in Chapter 3, the model is task-based, with the technology for producing a final
good modeled as a spectrum of production “tasks” that are ranked according to their degree of
technological sophistication. This spectrum serves as the basis for global production and value chain
analyses, and moving up the global value chain is then given a specific definition as an upgrading
in the set of tasks that a country, an industry, or a subsidiary specializes in. For different countries
and firms, the task-upgrading pattern may vary.
In the model, the learning-by-doing effect is the main driving force of multinational produc-
tion evolution. Subsidiaries in developing countries may receive tasks on which they lag behind
in terms of technology. By conducting these tasks, the subsidiaries engage in contact with foreign
advanced technologies, and further exploration and actualization of those technologies empower
efficiency improvement in these subsidiaries over time.
This chapter examines the dynamic welfare effects of participating in global production. As
global production converges to the steady state, the South experiences welfare gains constantly
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along the way. The North, in contrast, may see a long-run welfare level possibly lower than some
intermediate level of offshoring. Compared with autarky, the North enjoys positive gains since
the initial time when offshoring starts, and it is also better off in the long run, if the steady-state
offshoring threshold is within the range of offshorable tasks. The effect of offshoring turns out to
be different for the country with technological disadvantages. Engaging in offshoring may have a
negative effect for the South initially, wherein the short-term involves pains, but the effect dissipates
later while offshoring continues bringing welfare benefits to the country over time. In the long run,
the effect is always positive – the South is always better off at the steady state than it is under
autarky. Thus, both countries may benefit from joining in global production, but the paths differ.
Different effects contribute to the welfare dynamics. The South and North experience a
factor reward increase and decrease, respectively, when global production evolves. At the same
time, consumers in both countries enjoy an increasing number of consumption options on the
market – the number of varieties available keeps growing along the way. The output dynamics
of each variety also contributes to the welfare changes over time. These effects are analyzed and
discussed specifically in the chapter.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, I introduce the theoretical environment.
Section 4.2 studies the instantaneous equilibrium and the steady state situation in the long run.
In Section 4.3, I examine the evolution dynamics of task offshoring under different circumstances.
This section also includes discussions of the dynamics of other important economic aspects, such
as product variety and national welfare. Section 4.4 discusses the gains from fragmentation and
offshoring by comparing national welfare in the state of global production to the state under autarky.
Section 4.5 lists the major conclusions.
4.1 Set-up of the Model
Consider a world comprised of two countries: North (N) and South (S). There is an industry
supplying a differentiated final consumer product, in which there is a continuum of firms, each
producing a single and distinct variety indexed by j and selling it in both countries. Firms are
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symmetric – the final varieties are only different in the sense that they are under different brand
names. Labor is the sole factor of production, and it is inelastically supplied and immobile across
countries. The labor endowment of country i is denoted by Li, which is constant over time. Time
is continuous and is indexed by t.
4.1.1 Preference
Consumer preferences are assumed to be identical in the two countries, and the instantaneous
preference of a representative consumer at any time t is given by a C.E.S. utility function:
U(t) =
[∫ J(t)
0
q(j, t)ρdj
] 1
ρ
, (4.1)
where J(t) denotes the number of product varieties available and thus also the number of firms at
time t; q(j, t) is the consumption of good j at time t; and 0 < ρ < 1.
This instantaneous utility function implies that the elasticity of substitution between any two
varieties within this industry is constant and equals σ = 11−ρ > 1. As in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977),
the demand for brand j at time t is given by
q(j, t) =
E(t)p(j, t)−σ
P (t)1−σ
, (4.2)
where E(t) stands for the aggregate consumer expenditure at time t; p(j, t) denotes the price of
brand j at time t; and P (t) is a price index such that
P (t) =
[∫ J(t)
0
p(j, t)1−σdj
] 1
1−σ
. (4.3)
4.1.2 Product Market
Facing the constant elasticity demand function derived above, firms choose the same profit
maximization markup equal to 1ρ . Given the symmetry of firms, the pricing rule is thus given by
p(j, t) = p(t) =
c(j, t)
ρ
=
c(t)
ρ
, (4.4)
where c(t) is the marginal cost of producing any variety j at time t. Assuming no trade or trans-
portation cost, the price of any product is the same across countries.
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Firms need to pay a fixed cost during each time period. The fixed cost f > 0 is the amount
of Northern labor used. It can be viewed as the labor effort needed for conducting the necessary
non-offshorable activities. The fixed cost is the same for all firms. This yields the firm profit:
pi(j, t) = pi(t) =
E(t)
σ
(
c(t)
ρP (t)
)1−σ
− wN (t)f , (4.5)
where wN (t) is the wage level in the North at time t, and E(t) could be expressed as
E(t) =
∫ J(t)
0
p(j, t)q(j, t)dj . (4.6)
4.1.3 Production
The production of any variety requires the completion of an identical continuum of tasks,
indexed by z ∈ [0, 1]. The numeric value of z measures the technological sophistication of a task –
the larger z is, the more sophisticated the task is. The production technology is identical across all
varieties. Given the symmetry of firms, at time t, the production function for any variety j is
lnY (j, t) = lnY (t) =
∫ 1
0
lnx(j, z, t)dz , (4.7)
where x(j, z, t) is the amount of task z that is completed at time t for producing good j. Each task
can be located and carried out in either country.
Consider the production technology. For any task z, there is a minimum unit labor require-
ment, given by
a¯(z) = a¯e−z , (4.8)
where a¯ is a positive constant. It is time invariant and non-increasing in z.
The North masters the most advanced technologies for all tasks. Thus, the Northern plants
can perform any task using the minimum amount of labor indicated by a¯(z). In contrast, the
Southern plants lag behind technologically – they only possess the most efficient technology for
a range of low-sophistication tasks, and the situation is identical for all varieties’ production.
Specifically, initially at t = 0, the stock of technologies in the South is denoted by T (0), with
0 < T (0) < 1. For the relatively simple tasks with z ≤ T (0), the South is as efficient as the
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North in carrying out these tasks. For the tasks that are relatively difficult to carry out (with
z > T (0)), the South does not have the best technologies initially; and the more sophisticated a
task is, the further the South lags behind the North in terms of production technology. Specifically,
the Southern subsidiaries’ unit labor requirement schedule at t = 0 is given by1
a(z, 0) =

a¯(z) = a¯e−z , if z ≤ T (0),
a¯ez−2T (0) , if z > T (0).
(4.9)
4.1.4 Learning-by-Doing
Tasks can be completed in the South or in the North. Firms are multinational enterprises
in the sense that they have subsidiaries in both countries, performing different sets of tasks. For
the South, certain tasks beyond its technological capability may be offshored to the country, which
enables subsidiaries there to observe the technological gap between themselves and their North-
ern counterparts. By conducting these “beyond” tasks, the Southern plants can thus accumulate
experience and improve their own technologies, thereby enhancing production efficiency. This is
the effect of learning-by-doing in the South. Moreover, the learning-by-doing effect is assumed
to be bounded and with spillovers across tasks, with the North serving as the technology fron-
tier and learning boundary. Therefore, the Southern plants experience reduction in the unit labor
requirement over time:2
∂a(·, t)/∂t
a(·, t) = −
∫ 1
0
2β
{
1
∣∣∣∣a(z, t)a¯(z) > 1
}
LS(j, z, t) dz , (4.10)
where
{
1
∣∣∣a(z,t)a¯(z) > 1} is an indicator function that equals 1 if the learning room for task z in the
South is not exhausted at time t; LS(j, z, t) denotes the amount of labor used for conducting task
z in the Southern subsidiary of brand j at time t; and β > 0 is a parameter that measures the
learning ability of the South.
1 Given the symmetry of firms, subsidiaries in the same country have the same technologies, and thus the unit
labor requirement schedules do not depend on the variety argument j.
2 The environment here is built upon Young (1991), in which a general functional form of bounded learning-by-
doing is provided.
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On one hand, the function of learning-by-doing indicates that the Southern plants are not
able to learn from the tasks that they do not conduct. On the other hand, for tasks on which
learning space has already been exhausted (a(z, t) = a¯(z)), carrying them out does not contribute
to further efficiency improvement. The learning effect is positive only if the Southern plants perform
tasks for which they have not obtained the best techniques.
With the South’s initial unit labor requirement schedule and the learning-by-doing effect, the
unit labor requirement for completing a task z in the South at time t follows
a(z, t) =

a¯(z) = a¯e−z , if z ≤ T (t) ,
a¯ez−2T (t) , if z > T (t) ,
(4.11)
where T (t) refers to the technology stock in the South at time t. T (t) evolves according to
dT (t)
dt
=
∫ 1
T (t)
βLS(j, z, t)dz . (4.12)
Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of the unit labor requirement schedule in the South.
Figure 4.1: Unit Labor Requirement Evolution with Learning-by-Doing in the South
0 1
Unit Labor 
Requirement
z
North
South at t = 0
South at t > 0
T(0) T(t)
A task can be conducted by subsidiaries in the North or in the South, using the corresponding
technology indicated by function (4.8) or (4.11), depending on the offshoring pattern prevailing at
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the time. Each brand establishes only one subsidiary in a country, which completes all tasks
allocated to that country by its own brand. There is free entry in the market at all times. The new
entrants bring in new distinct brands/varieties, which use the same set of tasks and the identical
production function as all already-existing players do. Hence, when a new firm enters the market,
it will also use the same offshoring pattern as for the current firms. Free entry draws firms’ profit
to zero, which then determines the number of varieties present on the market.
4.2 Instantaneous Equilibrium and Steady State of Multinational Production
4.2.1 Instantaneous Equilibrium
Let wi(t) denote the wage rate prevailing in country i at time t. Then given the symmetry of
firms, the cost functions for conducting task z for any brand j in the two countries are, respectively,
CS(wS(t), j, z) = wS(t)a(z, t) , (4.13)
CN (wN (t), j, z) = wN (t)a¯(z) , (4.14)
Under offshoring, certain tasks are allocated to the South. As described earlier, for the range
of low-sophistication tasks with z ≤ T (t), the Southern plants are as competent in conducting them
as their Northern counterparts. However, for the high-end tasks, the South increasingly lags behind.
Thus, with consideration of production efficiency, the firms initially offshore relatively simple tasks,
with their Southern subsidiaries conducting low-end tasks while the Northern subsidiaries focus on
relatively sophisticated activities. Specifically, the cost functions (4.13) and (4.14) combine to form
a no-arbitrage condition in task offshoring, indicating the pattern of task allocation between the two
countries. There exists a threshold task z¯(t) at time t such that CN (wN (t), j, z) = CS(wS(t), j, z);
or equivalently,
wN (t) a¯(z¯(t)) = wS(t) a(z¯(t), t) , (4.15)
with z¯(t) denoting the most sophisticated task that is conducted in the Southern plants.3 Thus,
for all firms within the industry, tasks with z ∈ [0, z¯(t)] are allocated to the South, and tasks with
3 z¯(t) is the same across all plants because firms are symmetric.
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z ∈ (z¯(t), 1] are performed in the North. Given that the value chain of the industry is represented
by the whole spectrum of tasks that can be disintegrated and spread over national borders, with
each task adding value to the final industrial product, the pattern of task-allocation across countries
implied by condition (4.15) indicates countries’ respective position on the global value chain – the
South is lower than the North. This condition also implies that all firms incur the same marginal
cost of production and thus have the same pricing behavior at all times. Certainly, an essential
condition that enables offshoring is wS(t) ≤ wN (t), so that the South has the unit cost advantages
in performing those low-end activities. It will be shown later that this condition is always satisfied.
The labor market clearing conditions for the two countries at time t are given by
South :
∫ z¯(t)
0
xS(z, t)a(z, t)dz = LS , (4.16)
North :
∫ 1
z¯(t)
xN (z, t)a¯(z)dz + J(t)f = LN , (4.17)
where f is the fixed labor cost incurred by every firm in each time period; J(t) is the number of
varieties at time t; and xi(z, t) denotes the total amount of task z conducted by all subsidiaries in
country i at time t.
Let E(t) denote the total world expenditure on final products at time t. I0-t is equal to the
sum of factor payments in the two countries:
E(t) = wS(t)LS + wN (t)LN . (4.18)
Given the pricing rule, the demand for a task z conducted in country i at time t is given by
xi(z, t) =
ρE(t)
Ci(wi(t), z)
, i ∈ {N,S} , (4.19)
where Ci(wi(t), z) is the same across firms.
With the unit cost functions (4.13) and (4.14), along with (4.19), the labor market clearing
conditions become
South :
∫ z¯(t)
0
ρE(t)
wS(t)
dz = LS , (4.16
′)
North :
∫ 1
z¯(t)
ρE(t)
wN (t)
dz + J(t)f = LN . (4.17
′)
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The free-entry condition drives the firms’ profit to zero. Given the symmetry of firms, the
zero-profit condition can be simplified to4
E(t)
σJ(t)
= wN (t)f . (4.20)
Thus, the instantaneous aggregate equilibrium of the model at any time t is characterized
by the offshoring threshold determination condition (4.15), the labor market clearing conditions
(4.16′) and (4.17′), the world expenditure function (4.18), and the zero-profit condition (4.20). One
equilibrium equation here can be dropped by Walras’ law, so that one variable can be chosen as the
numeraire. I thus normalize the world expenditure at unity, with E(t) = 1. Hence, all the wages
are measured as shares of the world’s total factor income.
4.2.2 Steady State
At the steady state, the task-allocation pattern of global production stays stable. No more
tasks are reallocated from one country to the other. Other aspects of the two economies, such as
wage rates and the South’s technology stock, are also stabilized. By examining the labor market
clearing conditions (4.16′) and (4.17′), along with the zero-profit condition (4.20), it is found that
there exists a threshold task z∗ such that if all tasks with z ∈ [0, z∗] are offshored to the South
and all tasks with z ∈ (z∗, 1] are retained in the North, the wage rates of the two countries are
equalized. Specifically, the time-invariant z∗ is solved to be
z∗ =
LS
ρ (LS + LN )
. (4.21)
z∗ serves as the threshold task of offshoring at the steady state if it is within the range of
offshorable tasks ( LSρ (LS+LN ) ≤ 1).5 If z∗ exceeds the range of offshorable tasks, then offshoring
will stop when all offshorable tasks have been allocated to the South and the North focuses solely
on non-offshorable activities. In this circumstance, the task threshold of offshoring will be z∗′ = 1
4 It is straightforward to obtain (4.20) from examining the profit function (4.5), with considering the aggregate
price index expression (4.3) and the pricing rule specified by (4.4).
5 This condition is more likely to be satisfied if in consumers’ eyes, the degree of substitutability among varieties
is relatively high.
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at steady state. Therefore, the extent of substitutability among varieties in this industry largely
determines where the offshoring threshold will be at steady state. Certainly, with learning being
the main driving force of technical improvement, if both countries are involved in conducting the
offshorable tasks in the long run, the South will be as capable as the North on the tasks it conducts
when the steady state is achieved. The unit completion cost of the threshold task of offshoring at
the steady state is thus the same in the two countries. The steady state of global production is then
featured with equalized wage rates and all tasks being carried out using the best technologies.6
4.3 Transition Dynamics
Countries’ initial stocks of technology and their factor endowments determine their initial
positions on the global value chain, which further indicate the learning opportunities in the global
environment. As discussed earlier in the chapter, if a Southern subsidiary conducts tasks at which
it is not particularly competent, the learning effect will be positive in the sense that the production
efficiency on sophisticated tasks will be improved, through exploring advanced technologies while
carrying out the tasks. In contrast, by conducting tasks for which the best technologies have already
been in use, plants are not able to obtain further learning opportunities. Therefore, countries’ initial
positions on the global value chain are important for understanding the transitional dynamics. In
this section, I examine the transition dynamics of the model – the movement from an initial situation
of task-allocation to the steady state of global production.
Depending upon how far the South lags behind in terms of technology (essentially, where
T (0) is) and where the steady state is, there are four possible cases with regard to how global
production may evolve over time:
Case I. Normal Evolution This is the situation where the steady state stays within the range
of offshorable tasks (0 < z∗ ≤ 1) and the initial stock of technology in the South is not adequate for
efficiently performing all tasks that could be offshored to the country at the steady state (T (0) < z∗).
6 From here on, all notations with the superscript “∗” stand for corresponding variables at the long-run steady
state.
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Under this circumstance, the Southern plants acquire certain tasks that are moderately beyond
their technical capabilities. This will provide the South opportunities to learn and improve on
the production technology. The positive learning effect will then drive the equilibrium of global
production to the steady state, in which both countries participate in offshorable activities.7
Case II. Extreme-end Evolution In this case, the steady state of global production is z∗′ = 1.
Namely, at the steady state, all offshorable tasks will be allocated to the South, with the North
solely focusing on the non-offshorable activities. With initial Southern technology stock being
0 < T (0) < 1, the learning effect is positive here as in Case I – the global task allocation evolves
to the steady state as the Southern technology improves over time. What is different from Case
I is that the evolution path here is not smooth – the actual steady state (z∗′) lies in between the
initial equilibrium and the potential steady state (z∗ > 1), which thus leads to an interruption in
the potential evolution path. Once the global production pattern hits the extreme end of offshoring
while it evolves to the potential steady state, it will stop progressing further.
Case III. Static Normal Offshoring If the South’s initial technology stock is sufficiently high
(T (0) ≥ z∗), then global production arrives at the steady state at the initial time t = 0. Possessing
the best technologies for all tasks conducted in the country, the South will not see opportunities
for further learning, which thus leads to a static equilibrium situation.
Case IV. Static Complete Offshoring This situation happens when the South is technologi-
cally identical with the North (T (0) = 1) and the relative labor supply of the South is so large that
all offshorable tasks are offshored to the country since the initial time period. Since the variables hit
the boundary from the beginning, they will not change further during the following time periods.
Certainly, in this case, there is no positive learning effect present in the South.
Among the cases described above, I will mainly focus on Case I, the normal evolution, in this
chapter. This case can well illustrate the essential transitional dynamics of global production. The
other three cases can then be naturally and easily understood. For instance, Case II is essentially
7 This case indicates that the South has adequate labor but without enough of an initial stock of technologies,
which is the case for most developing countries that currently participate in global production.
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a variation of Case I, and it will be discussed briefly later in the section.
4.3.1 Task Dynamics
Given T (0) < z∗ ≤ 1, z¯(0) ∈ (T (0), z∗) follows. The reasons are that an offshoring threshold
at T (0) is not cost-minimizing for any firm and that without the best technologies for tasks beyond
T (0), it is costly for the Southern plants to conduct all tasks [0, z∗] compared to the North. By ex-
amining (4.15), (4.16′) , (4.17′) and (4.20), together with conditions (4.8) and (4.9), the equilibrium
at the initial time of offshoring (t = 0) is characterized by
e2z¯(0)−2T (0) =
1− ρz¯(0)
ρz¯(0)
LS
LN
, (4.22)
wS(0) =
ρz¯(0)
LS
, (4.23)
wN (0) =
1− ρz¯(0)
LN
, (4.24)
J(0) =
LN
σf (1− ρz¯(0)) . (4.25)
At equilibrium, with z¯(0) ∈ (T (0), z∗), the Southern plants receive not only all tasks that they can
conduct as efficiently as the North does, but also certain activities beyond their initial technical
capability because of the country’s abundance of labor. This initial equilibrium is illustrated in
Figure 4.2. Furthermore, given z¯(0) < z∗, it is the case wS(0) < 1LS+LN < wN (0). The relatively
low wage rate in the South ensures that the low-end activities for which the Southern plants have
the best technologies can be offshored.
The situation which involves the South conducting certain tasks that are moderately beyond
its capability will turn on the learning-by-doing effect, and thus the production efficiency will
improve gradually in the developing country. This effect will further attract more tasks to be
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Figure 4.2: Initial Task Offshoring: Normal Evolution (T (0) < z∗ ≤ 1)
0 1
Unit Labor 
Requirement
z
North
South at t=0
T(0) z(0) z*
offshored. At time t, the instantaneous equilibrium is characterized by
e2z¯(t)−2T (t) =
1− ρz¯(t)
ρz¯(t)
LS
LN
, (4.22′)
wS(t) =
ρz¯(t)
LS
, (4.23′)
wN (t) =
1− ρz¯(t)
LN
, (4.24′)
J(t) =
LN
σf (1− ρz¯(t)) . (4.25
′)
Following the same logic as discussed for the initial equilibrium, as long as T (t) < z∗, it is always
the case that the offshoring threshold lies between the South’s technology stock and the offshoring
steady state (i.e., z¯(t) ∈ (T (t), z∗)), which enables the South to learn. During the process, the wage
rate in the South is always lower than the Northern wage level (i.e., wS(t) <
1
LS+LN
< wN (t)).
The positive learning effect in the South is reflected by the accumulation of technology in
the country. The technology-stock indicator T (t) evolves over time according to the technology
accumulation path:8
dT (t)
dt
=
βLS
J(t)
z¯(t)− T (t)
z¯(t)
= βσf (1− ρz¯(t)) LS
LN
z¯(t)− T (t)
z¯(t)
. (4.26)
8 See Appendix B.1.1 for the derivation of (4.26).
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The learning effect implies that as long as the Southern plants perform certain tasks beyond their
technical capability (z¯(t) > T (t)), they can always learn from what they conduct (i.e., dT (t)dt > 0).
This positive learning-by-doing effect pushes the offshoring threshold further, with the South-
ern coverage of task‘ expanding to include more sophisticated activities. Namely, if the set of tasks
undertaken in a plant is viewed as the scope of the plant, then the learning effect will lead to scope
expansion in the Southern plants. This can be seen by examining (4.22′):
dz¯(t)
dt
=
2z¯(t) (1− ρz¯(t))
1 + 2z¯(t) (1− ρz¯(t)) ×
dT (t)
dt
, (4.27)
which implies
0 <
dz¯(t)
dt
<
dT (t)
dt
, (4.28)
as long as the learning room is not exhausted. With learning, the Southern plants are capable of
conducting tasks increasingly efficiently for those tasks at which they were not competent before;
together with a relatively low wage rate, the South attracts more and harder tasks to be undertaken
there. Certainly, while a wider range of low-sophistication tasks are being offshored to the South,
the North increasingly focuses on the most difficult activities ((z¯(t), 1]). Therefore, both low-
income and high-income countries move up the global value chain over time – they both experience
upgrading in the sets of tasks that their firms conduct.
As indicated by (4.26), how strong the learning effect is depends upon the relative learning
opportunities for the South – for which tasks there is still room for technology improvement, relative
to all tasks that are actually offshored (i.e., the distance between T (t) and z¯(t)). As time passes,
with dT (t)dt >
dz¯(t)
dt , the initial learning opportunities are gradually exhausted, which will in turn
slow down the pace of learning over time.9 This further translates into a concave-shaped time
path of offshoring evolution. As global production evolves, it is the case that10
d2T (t)
dt2
< 0, and
d2z¯(t)
dt2
< 0 . (4.29)
9 This pattern is not hard to tell from (4.26). The increase in z¯(t) with decrease in (z¯(t) − T (t)) leads dT (t)
dt
to
decline over time.
10 See Appendix B.1.1 and Appendix B.1.2 for proof.
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In the long run, both the technology stock in the South and the offshoring threshold converge
to the same steady state, z∗.11 When they arrive at the steady state, they will not grow further
beyond it. With equalized wage rates and both countries possessing the same best technologies for
tasks conducted domestically, the pattern of global production is stabilized.
In sum, the dynamics of both the technology stock in the South (T (t)) and the task-threshold
of offshoring (z¯(t)) display concave-shaped growth paths, both converging to the same steady state,
which serves as the upper bound. The convergence process is demonstrated in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Dynamics of Task Offshoring: Normal Evolution (T (0) < z∗ ≤ 1)
0
z(t)
T(t)
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z*
Certainly, factors such as the learning ability of the South (indicated by β), fixed cost (f),
variety substitutability of the industry (σ, and thus ρ), and the countries’ labor endowments (LS
and LN ) all have influence on the convergence paths. Numerical simulations are performed here
to examine how different variables may affect the evolution dynamics of global production. Figure
4.4 demonstrates the results of the numerical simulations. Panel A shows that the size of a country
can compensate for its production inefficiency – a larger although technically inefficient country
gets a wider range of tasks to carry out, both in the short run and in the long run. Panel B
shows the results from variation in the learning ability of the South. It is obvious that a Southern
11 This can be seen by examining (4.22′) at z∗.
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country with strong abilities to explore and actualize advanced technologies converges to its steady
state relatively quickly. In Panel C, variety substitutability is the main focus. First, an industry
with a higher variety substitutability tends to have less tasks offshored. This is because with high
substitutability among varieties, the demand for new ones is low. Therefore, the North will not
experience much pressure of bringing in new varieties, which thus allows for more labor in the North
to be devoted to current production activities. This leads to a relatively low offshoring threshold.
Second, the higher the variety substitutability is, the faster global production converges. Panel D
demonstrates how the fixed cost for non-offshorable activities affects the dynamics of offshoring –
a higher fixed cost leads to faster convergence. While more efforts are needed for the necessary
non-offshorable activities, labor in the North will be transferred to conduct those tasks more quickly
as new varieties enter the market, which thus accelerates the offshoring evolution process.
Figure 4.4: Dynamics of Task Offshoring under Normal Evolution (T (0) < z∗ ≤ 1): Simulations
(a) Panel A: Labor Endowment in the South
Note: LN = 100; β = 0.3; ρ = 0.7; f = 1; T (0) = 0.1
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(b) Panel B: Learning Ability
Note: LS = 100;  LN = 100; ρ = 0.7; f = 1; T (0) = 0.1
(c) Panel C: Variety Substitutability
Note: LS = 100;  LN = 100; β = 0.3; f = 1; T (0) = 0.1
4.3.2 Variety Dynamics
Under monopolistic competition, consumers’ love for variety provides the market with the
incentive to create and maintain different brands. With more and more tasks relocated to the
South, the labor in the North that was previously devoted to those offshorable tasks can now
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(d) Panel D: Fixed Cost for Branding
Note: LS = 100;  LN = 100; β = 0.3; ρ = 0.7; T (0) = 0.1
switch to conduct the non-offshorable activities. The evolution of offshoring thus brings a change
in industrial structure in the country. With more Northern efforts relieved from conducting the
offshorable activities, more varieties are brought into the market. This process can be seen by
examining the dynamics of variety along the evolution progress.
From (4.25′), it is found that12
dJ(t)
dt
> 0 , and
d2J(t)
dt2
< 0 (4.30)
along the way while global production evolves to its steady state, and this indicates a concave-
shaped time path for the number of varieties available on the market. In the long run, the number
of varieties converges to
J∗ =
LS + LN
σf
. (4.31)
Figure 4.5 displays the results from numerical simulations. A higher substitutability among
varieties leads to a smaller number of brands on the market both in the short run and in the long
run, as well as faster convergence to its steady state.
12 See Appendix B.2 for proof.
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Figure 4.5: Dynamics of Variety: Normal Evolution (T (0) < z∗ ≤ 1)
Note: LS = 100; LN = 100; β = 0.3; f = 1; T (0) = 0.1
4.3.3 Dynamics of Factor Income
As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, with offshoring, the wage rate in the South continues being
lower than that in the North while multinational production evolves. Then how do the wage levels
change over time? By examining (4.23′) and (4.24′), it is found that the wage rates in the two
countries are closely related to the offshoring threshold. With a constant labor size, the scope of
tasks conducted within a country determines the reward rate the workers there can obtain. With
technology improvements, even with the same amount of labor, the South can carry out more
activities, which is then reflected in the increasing factor price in this country. In contrast, the
North experiences a decline in factor price. In the long run, while global production reaches the
steady state, the two countries’ wage rates are equalized at:
w∗ =
1
LS + LN
, (4.32)
which indicates that in the long run, no matter what task a worker performs or which country he
or she is in, the wage rate is the same for all. Certainly, this factor-price-equalization condition
holds here when the natural steady state is within the range of offshorable tasks (z∗ ≤ 1) and labor
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flows freely among offshorable and non-offshorable tasks in the North. In the other cases where
the potential steady state z∗ goes beyond the range of offshorable tasks (z∗ > 1) so that the actual
steady state is at z∗′ = 1, the situation is different and will be discussed in later sections.
The wage rate dynamics in the South shows a concave-shaped path, while in the North it
displays a convex one, both converging to the steady-state wage rate w∗.13 Figure 4.6 demonstrates
the wage dynamics of the two countries.14
Figure 4.6: Dynamics of Wage Rates: Normal Evolution (T (0) < z∗ ≤ 1)
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It is clear that although the wage gap between the two countries exists initially in the short
run, it diminishes over time as tasks are increasingly offshored. In the long run, under normal
offshoring, the wage gap may be closed with factor prices equalized. At the steady state, workers
in the South enjoy the same income level as their Northern counterparts, even though they do
not master all the most advanced technologies. Hence, what matters most for workers is the
actualization of technologies, rather than the potential productivities that are not embodied in real
production.
13 From (4.23′) and (4.24′), dwS(t)
dt
= ρ
LS
dz¯(t)
dt
≥ 0, d2wS(t)
dt2
= ρ
LS
d2z¯(t)
dt2
≤ 0; dwN (t)
dt
= − ρ
LN
dz¯(t)
dt
≤ 0, d2wN (t)
dt2
=
− ρ
LN
d2z¯(t)
dt2
≥ 0.
14 Wage rates here are expressed as a share of the world expenditure, since E(t) has been normalized to 1.
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4.3.4 Dynamics of National Welfare
Per-Brand Output The evolution of task offshoring naturally translates into the evolution
of national welfare of the two countries. Given the utility function (4.1), national welfare depends
on both the number of varieties available on the market and the consumption or output volume of
each variety. From Section 4.3.2, it is found that the number of varieties keeps growing over time.
Now consider the output of each brand. Given the production function (4.7), it is found that the
per-brand output at time t is15
Y (t) =
ρσf
a¯
e
1
2 × ez¯(t)2−T (t)2 . (4.33)
Further examination of (4.33) shows that the dynamics of per-brand output may not display a
monotonic growth pattern over time. There exists a threshold task z˜y such that if less than z˜y tasks
are offshored to the South (i.e., the offshoring threshold z¯(t) < z˜y), the per-brand output increases
(dY (t)dt > 0); and if more than z˜y tasks are offshored (i.e., the offshoring threshold z¯(t) > z˜y), the
per-brand output experiences declines over time. Moreover, the threshold z˜y is below the offshoring
steady state z∗, which implies that when global production gets close to its steady state, the output
of each individual brand will see a decline pattern.16 Results from numerical simulations are
presented in Figure 4.7. It is obvious from the results that the further the South lags behind the
North initially in terms of technology, the more likely that the per-brand output will experience an
increase in the short run.
In the long run, the per-brand output always converges to its steady state:
Y ∗ =
ρσf
a¯
e
1
2 , (4.34)
which implies that a higher substitutability among varieties will lead to a higher steady state of
per-brand output. It is interesting to find that as global production evolves, Y (t) ≥ Y ∗. This
indicates an effect of crowding-out with technology improvement and free-entry: the number of
variety grows continuously, but at the same time, each individual variety’s output may decline.
15 See Appendix B.3.1 for the derivation of (4.33).
16 See Appendix B.3.2 for proof.
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Figure 4.7: Dynamics of Per-Brand Output: Normal Evolution (T (0) < z∗ ≤ 1)
Note: LS = 100;  LN = 100; β = 0.3; ρ = 0.7; f = 1; a¯ = 1
This reflects the interaction between consumers’ love for variety and the utility gains they enjoy
from production efficiency enhancement. Firms can produce more output because of the internal
technology improvement, but they also face mounting external competition pressure stemming from
new entrants that keep coming into the market. The interaction among these forces determines the
evolution path of the per-brand production.
The instantaneous utility function (4.1) indicates that the welfare of a representative con-
sumer in a country can be expressed as
Ui(t) =
[∫ J(t)
0
qi(j, t)
ρdj
] 1
ρ
= Liwi(t)Y (t)J(t)
1
ρ , i ∈ {N, S} , (4.35)
where Ui(t) represents the welfare level of the representative consumer in country i at time t, and
qi(j, t) denotes the consumption amount of variety j in country i at time t. The national welfare
of a country thus is determined by three effects: (1) the income effect, which is indicated by the
aggregate national income indicator, Liwi(t); (2) the per-variety output effect, represented by Y (t);
and (3) the variety effect, which is given by the last term, J(t)
1
ρ .
With conditions (4.23′), (4.24′), (4.25′), and (4.33), the two countries’ consumer welfares are,
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respectively,
US(t) = ρ×
(
LN
σf
) 1
ρ
× ρσf
a¯
× e 12 ×
[
z¯(t) (1− ρz¯(t))− 1ρ ez¯(t)2−T (t)2
]
, (4.36)
and
UN (t) =
(
LN
σf
) 1
ρ
× ρσf
a¯
× e 12 ×
[
(1− ρz¯(t))1− 1ρ ez¯(t)2−T (t)2
]
. (4.37)
Dynamics of welfare in the South Examining the South’s consumer welfare indicated
by (4.36), it is found that the utility level enjoyed by Southern consumers keeps increasing since the
initial time t = 0 (i.e., dUS(t)dt > 0), until global production reaches the steady state.
17 Therefore,
for the South, although the world output of each brand may experience a decline over time, the
other two effects, i.e., the income effect and the variety effect, are positive and dominate the
evolution.18 With increasing income and a growing number of varieties, the South keeps enjoying
welfare improvements while taking more and more production tasks. In the long run, the national
welfare of the South reaches its steady state:
U∗S =
LS
LS + LN
×
(
LS + LN
σf
) 1
ρ
× ρσf
a¯
× e 12 . (4.38)
Dynamics of welfare in the North For the North, the situation is different. Among
the three effects, the national income decreases for the North, which can be seen from (4.24′). The
per-variety output also decreases when global production gets close to the steady state. The only
effect that keeps experiencing positive growth is the number of varieties. By examining (4.37), it is
found that the national welfare of the North may be non-monotonic over time. There is a threshold
z˜UN that serves as a stationary point. If the offshoring threshold (z¯(t)) is right at z˜UN , it is the case
that dUN (t)dt = 0. When less than z˜UN tasks are allocated to the Southern plants for completion
(z¯(t) < z˜UN ), the consumers in the North experience growth in their utility (
dUN (t)
dt > 0). In
contrast, when more than z˜UN tasks are offshored (z¯(t) > z˜UN ), the Northern welfare declines over
time (dUN (t)dt < 0). This stationary point is further found to be higher than z˜y.
19
17 See Appendix B.4.1 for proof.
18 This could be seen from conditions (4.23′), (4.28) and (4.30).
19 See Appendix B.4.2 for proof.
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Therefore, after the per-brand output reaches the peak amount and when it starts to decline,
the consumers in the North can still enjoy an increasing utility for an extended period of time,
during which the variety effect dominates the other two, while both the national income and the
production of each variety decrease. Consequently, Northern consumers’ utility has two possible
different evolution paths. In the first case, the South initially receives relatively few tasks, with
z¯(0) < z˜UN . The variety effect, possibly with a positive output effect, is significant so that the
Northern consumers get increasingly better off in the short run. This trend is reversed after more
than z˜UN tasks are offshored. The other possible path happens when the Southern plants obtain
a relatively large range of activities initially beyond z˜UN , which will lead the North to experience
persistent declines in welfare until the steady state is reached. No matter which path is realized,
the steady-state level of Northern welfare is
U∗N =
LN
LS + LN
×
(
LS + LN
σf
) 1
ρ
× ρσf
a¯
× e 12 (4.39)
in the long run. Compared with the initial level UN (0), the long-run steady-state welfare U
∗
N is not
necessarily higher or lower. The interaction among the three effects, as well as the initial situation,
determines where the final case is.
Figure 4.8 displays results from simulations with different parameter values. Panel A displays
how the variety substitutability may affect the two countries’ welfare dynamics. For both countries,
the lower the substitutability is, the higher the long-run welfares are at the steady state. This
implies that consumers’ love for variety is important in the sense that it can strengthen and enlarge
the variety effect on national welfare, which is always positive for both countries among the three.
Panel B shows the situations with different relative Southern labor endowments. The results show
that a larger South engaging in offshoring can bring both countries higher welfares. Thus, for
technologically advanced countries, it is to their benefit to cooperate with developing countries
with relatively large factor supplies. Compared with small ones, a large developing host country
has more resources that can be devoted to learning in global production,20 which empowers a
20 Consider that the offshoring threshold at the steady state is relatively high.
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bigger improvement in technologies. This will lead to more products and varieties being produced
and thus to a higher national welfare.
Figure 4.8: Dynamics of National Welfare under Normal Evolution (T (0) < z∗ ≤ 1): Simulations
(a) Panel A: Variety Substitutability
Note: LS = 100; LN = 100; β = 0.3; f = 1; T (0) = 0.01; a¯ = 1
(b) Panel B: Size of the South
Note: LN = 100; β = 0.3; ρ = 0.7; f = 1; T (0) = 0.1; a¯ = 1
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4.3.5 Extreme-End Evolution
In the case of extreme-end evolution, the potential steady state z∗ is beyond the range of
offshorable tasks (z∗ > 1), which thus leads the actual steady state of global production to be
z∗′ = 1 in the long run. The most sophisticated offshorable task serves as the upper bound of
offshoring, where global production saturates. Therefore, all offshorable tasks will be offshored to
the South in the long run under this circumstance – theoretically, a situation that may happen if
the South is sufficiently abundant in production factors relative to the North. The North will then
focus solely on the non-offshorable activities.
Task Offshoring Dynamics The dynamics of variables are essentially variations of the
normal-evolution situation. With both the South’s initial technology stock T (0) and the initial
offshoring threshold z¯(0) within the task range (0, 1), all aspects of the two economies behave as
if the steady state is z∗ at the beginning. Thus, the dynamics of task offshoring at first displays
a pattern of convergence similar to the corresponding one discussed in the normal-evolution case.
Once all offshorable tasks have been allocated to the South (z¯(tz) = 1), further offshoring will not
happen. However, the South’s technical capability will continue improving for some time, until
it matches the range of tasks offshored (T (t∗′) = 1,with t∗′ > tz). The evolution paths of task
offshoring and technology stock are shown in Figure 4.9. The left panel displays the potential
dynamics if the offshorable tasks’ range could go beyond z = 1. The right panel shows the actual
dynamics of the technology stock T (t) and the offshoring threshold z¯(t) over time. Offshoring
stops progressing when the offshoring threshold reaches the upper bound. After that, the South’s
technological capability continues improving, although the speed of learning is lower compared with
the potential case.21 The actual steady state will be arrived at when the technology stock in the
South matches the offshoring pattern (T ∗′ = z∗′ = 1).
Factor Price and Number of Varieties Consider other variables characterizing the
economies, such as the wage rates and the number of varieties. At first, before the South obtains
all offshorable activities to conduct (z¯(t) < 1), they all follow the same corresponding paths of
21 This can be understood by examining equation (4.26).
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Figure 4.9: Task Dynamics under Extreme-End Evolution (z∗ > 1, z∗′ = 1)
Note: LN = 100 ;LS = 100 ;β = 0.3 ; ρ = 0.4 ; f = 1 ;T (0) = 0.1
evolution as what they would experience if the task range could go beyond z = 1. Then when all
offshorable tasks are moved to the South, the wage rates in the two countries stop changing. Thus,
their evolution paths are not smooth – the time when offshoring hits its upper limit is a singular
point when the wage rates reach their bounds and also their final steady states. Given that z∗′ = 1,
the factor prices in the long run are w∗′S =
ρ
LS
and w∗′N =
1−ρ
LN
respectively, with w∗′S < w
∗′
N .
22
Therefore, the factor-price-equalization condition is not achieved in this case. For the number
of varieties, the situation is similar. It stops growing once all offshorable tasks are allocated to
the Southern plants. With all Northern efforts solely spent on non-offshorable activities, the total
number of varieties on the market is given by J∗′ = LNf in the long run. Figure 4.10 presents the
evolution paths for wage rates and for the number of varieties.
Output and Welfares Production efficiency is the key factor determining output and
thus national welfare levels. After the offshoring threshold stops moving further, the learning effect
continues being positive in the South for some time, but is weaker than it would be if there was no
22 Consider that z∗ = LS
ρ(LS+LN )
> 1 in this case.
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Figure 4.10: Dynamics of Wage Rates and Number of Varieties under Extreme-End Evolution
(z∗ > 1, z∗′ = 1)
(a) Panel A: Dynamics of Wage Rates
0 t
wN*'
wN(t)
wS(t)
wS*'
(b) Panel B: Dynamics of Number of Variety
0 t
J*'
J(t)
compulsory limit on offshoring. This weaker-than-potential learning effect keeps driving production
aspects of the economies to their long-run steady states. In Section 4.3.4, it has been shown that
the growth path of per-variety output may be non-monotonic. The situation is similar under the
circumstance here. When both countries participate in offshorable activities (z¯(t) < 1), the growth
path of the per-variety output is the same as if it is moving towards the potential steady state z∗,
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and it may or may not show positive growth in the short-run. When all offshorable tasks have been
allocated to the South (z¯(t) = 1), the per-brand output starts to be described by23
Y (t)′ =
LSf
LN a¯
× e−(T (t)−1)2+ 12 , (4.40)
which increases over time while the South improves its technology.24 In the long run, it converges
to its steady state
Y ∗′ =
LSf
LN a¯
e
1
2 , (4.41)
when the South has possessed the most advanced technologies for all tasks. Compared with the
normal-evolution case, if the South takes all offshorable production responsibilities, in the long run,
there will be more brands on the market(J∗′ > J∗), while less of each is supplied (Y ∗′ < Y ∗).
With regard to national welfare, before the offshoring threshold z¯(t) reaches the most sophis-
ticated offshorable task, like in the normal-evolution case, the South experiences positive growth
since the very beginning of engaging in global production, while the North may see different pos-
sible patterns of growth over time. However, during the period of time when all tasks have been
offshored and the South is still learning (z¯(t) = 1 and T (t) < 1), both countries will experience
welfare growth. Specifically, with the per-brand output expression derived above, during this time
period, the national welfares of the two countries are, respectively,
US(t)
′ = ρ×
(
LN
f
) 1
ρ
−1
× LS
a¯
× e−(T (t)−1)2+ 12 , (4.42)
and
UN (t)
′ = (1− ρ)×
(
LN
f
) 1
ρ
−1
× LS
a¯
× e−(T (t)−1)2+ 12 . (4.43)
Both of them will be increasing monotonically while T (t) < 1 and dT (t)dt > 0. When the South’s
technology stock covers the most sophisticated task, the welfares converge to their steady states:
U?′S = ρ
(
LN
f
) 1
ρ
−1 LS
a¯
e
1
2 , (4.44)
23 See Appendix B.5.1 for derivation of (4.40).
24 See Appendix B.5.2 for proof.
62
and
U?′N = (1− ρ)
(
LN
f
) 1
ρ
−1 LS
a¯
e
1
2 . (4.45)
With the discussion above and in Section 4.3.4, it is found that during the process of evolving, the
South continues seeing welfare improvement, although the speed of improvement may decrease. For
the North, the overall path of welfare development may be non-monotonic. Numerical simulations
are performed for per-brand output as well as for national welfares. The results are shown in Figure
4.11. Panel A displays the simulation results for the per-brand output. After all manufacturing
tasks are offshored to the South, the learning effect stimulates another round of output growth.
For the national welfare results displayed in Panel B, the South sees positive increases in national
utility during the whole evolution process. For the North, although the initial growth pattern is
uncertain, after all manufacturing tasks are taken by the South, the country will also experience
positive growth – the learning effect will benefit both countries by increasing the output of each
brand.
Figure 4.11: Dynamics of Output and Welfares under Extreme-End Evolution (z∗ > 1, z∗′ = 1)
(a) Panel A: Dynamics of Per-Brand Output
Note: LS = 100; LN = 100; β = 0.3; ρ = 0.4; f = 1; a¯ = 1
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(b) Panel B: Dynamics of National Welfares
Note: LS = 10; LN = 10; β = 0.3; f = 1; T (0) = 0.3; a¯ = 1
4.3.6 Static Equilibrium Cases
Except for the dynamic situations where countries see evolutions of their multinational op-
erations, there are two other static equilibrium possibilities: Case III – static normal offshoring, in
which the South’s initial technology stock is sufficiently high so that global production reaches its
normal steady state z∗ ∈ (0, 1) at the initial time t = 0; and Case IV – static complete offshoring,
where since the very beginning, the South is essentially the same as the North in terms of technol-
ogy (T (0) = 1), and the factor endowment of the South is abundant so that all offshorable tasks
are moved to the South since t = 0.
The static normal offshoring situation is likely to happen if the South is technically capable
and relatively small in size, so that T (0) ≥ z∗. When this situation prevails, there will be no room
for the South to learn, as the country is not working on any activity at which it is not already
skilled. Therefore, the world equilibrium stays at z∗ since t = 0, with all other aspects of the two
economies at their steady states since the initial time.
The other static case is essentially a multinational production situation with two countries
equally advanced in terms of technology on conducting the offshorable activities. The South is
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relatively large such that z∗ > 1 and z¯(0) = 1. If this is the case, then the country with abundant
factor endowment will be specializing in offshorable tasks, while the other one puts all efforts on
the non-offshorable activities. Learning is not present here as both countries already possess the
best technologies since the beginning. Therefore, this pattern of specialization will hold as long as
factor supplies remain stable. The two economies are at the steady states characterized by z∗′ = 1.
4.4 Gains from Offshoring
The discussion so far focuses on the time dynamics of offshoring evolution. It has been shown
that compared with the initial situation when the two countries start engaging in offshoring, the
South becomes increasingly better off over time, while the North may or may not see a higher
welfare level at the long-run steady state. Then the question becomes whether the countries should
participate in global production by offshoring or accepting offshored activities, or they should
remain closed and supply all products domestically.
4.4.1 Equilibrium under Autarky
The consumer preferences are still identical in the two countries under autarky, described by
the same C.E.S. function (4.1). The production of goods, as well as the two countries’ produc-
tion technologies, is also the same as defined in Section 4.1.3. Namely, the two economies start
with the situations under autarky the same as under offshoring. Under autarky, countries do not
have information about each other, and thus they are not able to acknowledge their technological
differences in production. Without seeing the gap, the South does not have incentives to learn,
though it conducts all the activities under this circumstance. Therefore, under autarky, there is
no production efficiency improvement over time like what we have seen under offshoring. Since
countries’ behaviors do not change over time, the time index t can be omitted here.
In autarky, both countries have to conduct all activities on the task range [0, 1] to produce
the final goods, and both of them also need to pay the fixed costs, which are assumed to be the
same (f), to make the products viewable on the market. Let EAi denote the national expenditure
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on final products in country i under autarky, defined as the sum of factor payments in that country:
EAi = w
A
i Li , i ∈ {N, S} , (4.46)
where wAi denotes the autarky wage rate of country i.
Assume that the fixed cost is the same across countries: fS = fN = f . The labor market
clearing conditions for the two economies under autarky are given by
South :
∫ 1
0
xAS (z)a(z, 0)dz + J
A
S f = LS ,
North :
∫ 1
0
xAN (z)a¯(z)dz + J
A
Nf = LN ,
where xAi (z) denotes the total amount of task z conducted in country i by all firms there, and J
A
i
denotes the number of brands on the market in country i, both under autarky. The task demands
can be expressed as:
xAS (z) =
ρEAS
wAS a(z, 0)
=
ρLS
a(z, 0)
,
xAN (z) =
ρEAN
wAN a¯(z)
=
ρLN
a¯(z)
.
With the task demands, the labor market clearing conditions become:
South :
∫ 1
0
ρLSdz + J
A
S f = LS , (4.47)
North :
∫ 1
0
ρLNdz + J
A
Nf = LN . (4.48)
The numbers of varieties in the two domestic markets thus are:
JAi =
Li
σf
, i ∈ {N, S} . (4.49)
Given the production function (4.7), together with the task demand expressions, technology
specifications (4.8) and (4.9), and condition (4.49), the per-brand outputs under autarky are found
to be
Y AS =
ρσf
a¯
× e−(T (0)−1)2+ 12 , (4.50)
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and
Y AN =
ρσf
a¯
× e 12 . (4.51)
Together with the number of varieties JAi , this implies that the national utility levels of the two
countries are, respectively,
UAS =
(
LS
σf
) 1
ρ
× ρσf
a¯
× e−(T (0)−1)2+ 12 , (4.52)
and
UAN =
(
LN
σf
) 1
ρ
× ρσf
a¯
× e 12 , (4.53)
which remain constant over time.
4.4.2 Gains from Normal Offshoring
Under normal offshoring, global production is characterized by the participation of both
countries in offshorable tasks, in the short run as well as in the long run. During the process of
normal evolution, the national welfares are given by (4.36) and (4.37).
Gains of the South For the South, comparing the welfare under offshoring and the welfare
under autarky, it is found that
US(t)
UAS
=
[
LN
LS
× 1
1− ρz¯(t)
] 1
ρ
×
[
ρz¯(t)× ez¯(t)2−T (t)2 × e(T (0)−1)2
]
. (4.54)
Countries’ welfare levels essentially depend on the number of varieties available on the market and
the consumption or output of each product. The first term of the equation above indicates the
variety effect (the extensive margin), while the second implies the output (or consumption) effect
(the intensive margin).
When the South opens to offshoring, the Southern labor that was working on non-offshorable
tasks is withdrawn and reassigned to conduct the offshored activities. Therefore, the number of
goods available is no longer totally determined within the country, while the North takes over
certain responsibilities. This international shift of non-offshorable efforts brings uncertainty with
regard to whether the developing country can enjoy more variety options initially when countries
67
start to engage in global production. During the initial stages when offshoring starts, the South may
or may not be able to obtain the same number of varieties as they could under autarky. Then as
time elapses, the situation improves. While more and more tasks are reallocated to the South which
enables more Northern efforts to be put on non-offshorable activities, both countries’ consumers
can enjoy more variety options over time. In the long run, it is found that J
∗
JAS
= LS+LNLS > 1, which
indicates that with offshoring and learning, the Southern consumers will enjoy more varieties than
they could under autarky. By participating in global production, the South not only obtains better
technologies, but also enjoys more options for consumption. This variety effect contributes to the
long-run welfare gain of the country.
Concerning the output effect, it is not definite that the South can enjoy more consumption
on each brand at the initial time when it starts producing for the whole world. The output also
depends on the North’s conditions. In the long run, the output effect indicated by the second term
of (4.54) turns out to be indefinite as well.25
Combining the two effects, both the variety and the output effects, it is found that
U∗S
UAS
=
[
LS + LN
LS
] 1
ρ
−1
× e(T (0)−1)2 > 1 . (4.55)
Therefore, although the gain from engaging in global production is not definite for the South in the
short run, it will certainly benefit the South in the long run. This is different from the offshoring
case under perfect competition discussed in Chapter 3, where the South sees gains in both the
short run and the long run. By accepting offshored activities and by learning in the process of
conducting them, the South under monopolistic competition may experience short-run pains, but
it will end up enjoying more consumption choices, which dominates the other welfare effect.
Gains of the North Consider the situation for the North. By comparing (4.37) and
(4.53), it is the case that
UN (t)
UAN
=
[
1
1− ρz¯(t)
] 1
ρ
×
[
(1− ρz¯(t))× ez¯(t)2−T (t)2
]
> 1 , (4.56)
25 When the global economy reaches the steady state z∗, the second term becomes: ρz∗ × e(T (0)−1)2 = LS
LS+LN
×
e(T (0)−1)
2
, which is not necessarily greater or less than 1.
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which is greater than 1 since the initial time of offshoring (t = 0). The first term in the equation
is the variety effect for the North, while the second indicates the consumption or output effect.
By relocating low-sophistication tasks to the South, the North is able to produce more va-
rieties since the very beginning of offshoring. Thus, the variety effect is positive initially and will
continue strengthening over time as more and more production tasks are offshored. The other one,
the per-brand consumption effect, is not deterministic for the North, but it is dominated by the
variety effect, which then leads to the situation where the North overall is better off than under
autarky since the start of engaging in global production. In the long run, the utility comparison
shows that the North ultimately benefits from offshoring:
U∗N
UAN
=
[
LS + LN
LN
] 1
ρ
−1
> 1. (4.57)
In sum, from the analyses above, participating in global production is beneficial for both
countries. Even if they may experience short-term challenges when they initially join in the global
production network and/or during the process in which they are evolving to the steady state, they
both will ultimately see positive gains and rewards from offshoring. The results from simulations
clearly demonstrate this pattern, and are shown in Figure 4.12. In the simulation, although both
countries initially experience a cut in per-brand consumption when they join in global production,
they do see welfare gains in the long run compared with autarky. This also further confirms that
for the static normal offshoring case, although learning is not present, both countries can still earn
positive gains by forming a multinational production network.
4.4.3 Gains from Extreme-End Offshoring
In the case of extreme-end offshoring, in the long run, all offshorable tasks are ultimately
allocated to the South. During the process of evolution, as discussed in the previous section, the
South may experience short-run challenges while the North is always better off compared with the
autarky situation. Consider the long-run welfare at the steady state. By comparing (4.44) and
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Figure 4.12: Welfare Gains from Offshoring: Normal Evolution
Note: LS = 100; LN = 100; β = 0.3; ρ = 0.7; f = 1; T (0) = 0.1; a¯ = 1
(4.52), as well as (4.45) and (4.53), it is the case that
U∗′S
UAS
=
(
LN
LS
× 1
1− ρ
) 1
ρ
−1
× e(T (0)−1)2 , (4.58)
and
U∗′N
UAN
=
LS
LN
× 1
ρ
× (1− ρ)2− 1ρ . (4.59)
Close examinations show that on one side, there is no deterministic relationship between
U∗′S and U
A
S , which implies that with extreme-end offshoring, although all offshorable tasks are
ultimately moved to the South, the country does not necessarily gain from producing for the whole
world. The main reason is that the variety effect is found not to be necessarily significant in the
long run in this case.26 On the other side, the North does see welfare gains from offshoring in the
long run (
U∗′N
UAN
> 1).27 Figure 4.13 displays the results of the simulations, which clearly show the
patterns discussed here.
26 J∗′
JA
S
= σ × LN
LS
, which is not necessarily greater than 1 here.
27 See Appendix B.6 for proof.
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Figure 4.13: Welfare Gains from Offshoring: Complete Offshoring
Note: LS = 10; LN = 4; β = 0.2; ρ = 0.4; f = 1; T (0) = 0.3; a¯ = 1
4.5 Concluding Remarks
Given the basic model introduced in Chapter 3, this chapter examines the global production
dynamics within a monopolistic competition environment. The model provides rich descriptions
on various economic aspects. First, both countries move up the global production and value chain
through learning-by-doing in the South, with subsidiaries in the South conducting more and harder
tasks and subsidiaries in the North increasingly concentrating on the most sophisticated activities
and the non-offshorable responsibilities. It is also possible that all offshorable tasks are moved to
the technologically less-advanced country under this framework.
Secondly, the offshoring dynamics that occur through learning give rise to changes in other
aspects of the global economy, such as factor prices and number of varieties on the market. While
consumers will enjoy more and more consumption options as more firms join the competition, the
output of each firm may not display a monotonic increasing pattern. Considering also the factor
price effects, the welfare dynamics can be quite different for countries.
Welfare analysis is thus an important issue that this chapter looks at. Different from the
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situation under perfect competition, under normal offshoring here, the South does not necessarily
gain in the short run by accepting offshoring. It may be the case that the developing country
experiences a short-run pain by participating in global production – it gives up its authority on
variety-determination and hands it over to the developed country by agreeing to produce for North-
ern brands, and this may lead to a welfare loss for the South during the initial stages of offshoring.
In the long run, however, the learning effect will lead the South to be better off than its autarky
situation. Meanwhile, the North enjoys a higher welfare level since the beginning of offshoring, and
it continues in the long run. Thus, although both parties are rewarded by forming the multinational
production chain, their paths of welfare dynamics can be quite different. What is noteworthy here is
the complete-offshoring situation, where all offshorable responsibilities are taken over by the South.
In this case, the South may not gain even in the long run, while the North always benefits.
Chapter 5
Moving Up the Global Value Chain: Evidence from China
As presented in Chapter 3 and 4, the global value chain of an industry is described as a
sequence of tasks that may be fragmented and spread across countries, with each task adding
value to the final product. Countries’ respective contributions to the final product can thus be
associated with the sets of tasks they carry out. A central prediction of the theories presented
is that multinational production converges to a steady state where no further offshoring happens.
During this evolution process, the national contribution of value-added as well as the national
share of world income is dynamically redistributed between countries – the Southern part increases
while the Northern part decreases, and the speed of redistribution declines over time. In fact,
the convergence of the Southern value-added portion essentially and exactly maps the convergence
pattern of task-offshoring. Therefore, the theory offers a convenient prediction as to how the South’s
share of value-added in an industry should behave over time: “moving up the global value chain”
translates into an increasing Southern share of value added in total value of industrial output over
time, while the speed of moving up declines gradually.
In this chapter, a micro-founded approach is applied to empirically examine the dynamics of
the value-added ratio (VR) of global production contributed by the South (i.e. the host country’s
share of value added). By using a dataset on China’s multinational operations spanning 10 years,
the evolution pattern of industry-level VR is examined. The VR change of multinational operation
is analyzed at the industry level, and the aggregate VR change is further decomposed into a within-
subsidiary margin and a cross-subsidiary margin, with convergence testing pursued for these two
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margins respectively. The results show that convergence evidences are present, and the industrial
VR dynamics are mainly driven by changes within subsidiaries.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.1, I review the theoretical
predictions on VRs of multinational production. Section 5.2 discusses the empirical approach.
Data description is presented in Section 5.3, and empirical results are presented in Section 5.4. I
give a brief conclusion summary for this chapter in Section 5.5.
5.1 Review of the Theoretical Prediction
The evolution process of multinational production involves a shift of value added in the final
industrial product from the North to the South. According to the monopolistic competition model
presented in Chapter 4, the final output value of an industry within global production is given by
J(t)p(j, t)Y (j, t) = wS(t)LS + wN (t)LN , (5.1)
with all tasks contributing value to the final product. Within the final industrial output value, the
contribution shares of the two countries are, respectively,
VRN (t) =
wN (t)LN
p(j, t)Y (j, t)J(t)
= 1− ρz¯(t) , (5.2)
and
VRS(t) =
wS(t)LS
p(j, t)Y (j, t)J(t)
= ρz¯(t) , (5.3)
which are defined as the value-added ratios (VR) hereafter. The growth pattern of the South-
ern value-added portion VRS thus essentially and exactly maps the convergence pattern of task-
offshoring in multinational production. As analyzed in Chapter 4, under normal offshoring, the
task offshoring threshold z¯(t) grows and converges to its steady state z∗ over time. Even in the
case of extreme-end evolution, it goes through the convergence process first until it hits the upper
limit of offshorable activities. Therefore, the theory actually provides a central prediction on VRS
– it increases over time at a decreasing rate.1 “Moving up the value chain” thus translates into
1 In the prefect competition model, the South’s contribution of value-added displays the same pattern.
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an increase in the South’s share of value added in the total value of industrial output (VRS) over
time, and the rate of this increase declines gradually. This is the critical theoretical prediction and
a testable hypothesis as to how the VRS should behave over time. By considering each industry
as a random draw of the representative industry presented in the model, I can thus test the theory
and its prediction with regard to the dynamics of VRS .
5.2 Empirical Approach
5.2.1 Data on Multinational Operations: the Usage
For a given Southern country that hosts multinational operations, the rest of the world is
treated as a whole as an aggregate North. The investigation will mainly focus on the multinational
subsidiaries in the host country. The main reason for focusing on multinational subsidiaries is that
they are the closest approximations of global production operations examined in the theory. On one
hand, in reality, although both vertical and horizontal offshoring patterns are present, a common
acknowledgment is that multinational subsidiaries in a developing host country generally only con-
duct some of the production tasks, rather than replicating the whole complete production processes.
Therefore, multinational subsidiaries provide a reasonable base for the empirical investigation of
the theoretical model. On the other hand, certainly, domestic and local firms in a host country may
also be involved in the global production network in some way, but distinguishing them is difficult,
and their operations in fact may be mixed in many circumstances. Multinational subsidiaries thus
serve as a better representation than local firms for global production in the South.
By focusing on multinational subsidiaries, local firms in a host country can serve as a coun-
tercheck. For domestic firms that are not multinational subsidiaries, the value-added ratios con-
structed from their performance data are not expected to follow the same convergence pattern of
VRS . Thus, examining local firms as a counter group can help to check whether the findings based
on multinational subsidiaries represent a nation-wide trend or are specific to global production.
Multinational subsidiaries are aggregated at the industry level to form multinational indus-
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tries (MIs), which closely approximate the concept of industry in the theory. It is not required
that an MI in the South involves the very last task of producing final end-consumer products. For
example, an MI may be defined as a “screen” industry while the very final consumer products are
cellphones. Thus, an MI is an industry of multinational production where the industrial products
come out in a given host country. The VRS of an MI is thus computed as
VRS,i(t) =
∑
j∈Ωi(t) pj(t)yj(t)−
∑
j∈Ωi(t)Mj(t)∑
j∈Ωi(t) pj(t)yj(t)
, (5.4)
where i and j are industry and firm indicators, respectively; Ωi(t) is the set of subsidiaries in indus-
try i in the host country; pj(t)yj(t) stands for the value of output; and Mj(t) denotes the value of
intermediate inputs. Here, Mi(t) =
∑
j∈Ωi(t)Mj(t) covers intermediate inputs from both domestic
and foreign sources, since they are not different as non-value-added entities for the Southern MIs.
The labor concept in the theory should be viewed as a composite factor of production in reality,
which essentially contains all efforts that are used in production. VRS will serve as the base variable
in the empirical investigation.
5.2.2 Convergence of VRS
Using panel data of MIs over a certain period of time, the convergence dynamics of VRS can be
examined (VR for short hereafter). Specifically, given the theoretical discussions, the convergence
pattern of VR can essentially be characterized by
∆VRi,τ = ψ1VRi,0 + ψ2βi + ψ3τ + η
′Xi,τ + i,τ , (5.5)
where βi is the learning-ability indicator, τ is a time indicator starting from 1 for the first time
period covered in the data, Xi,τ is a vector of control variables and i,τ is the error term. The
theory predicts that ψ1 < 0, ψ2 > 0, and ψ3 < 0. The specification (5.5) may be affected by the
tendency of VR to mechanically revert to its mean. A negative shock at τ = 0 may not have a
persistent effect in following periods, which may lead to a spurious convergence captured by the
regression. To address this concern, VRi from different initial years are used for robustness checks.
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5.2.3 Two Margins of Changes
In the theory, the convergence of task offshoring stems from the learning effect occurring
at the firm level, which drives the progress of the whole industry. To investigate this idea, I
decompose changes in VR into two margins: (1) the within-subsidiary margin, which captures the
changes within subsidiaries with constant relative subsidiary sizes, and (2) the cross-subsidiary
margin, i.e., the change in relative subsidiary size with subsidiaries’ VR constant. An empirical
pattern consistent with the theory is that the VR convergence of MIs is mainly driven by the first
margin. The decomposition method is as follows:
∆VRi,τ =
∑
j∈Ωi
∆VRj,τ
(
λj,τ + λj,τ−1
2
)
+
∑
j∈Ωi
∆λj,τ
(
VRj,τ + VRj,τ−1
2
)
, (5.6)
where λj,τ =
yj,τ
yi,τ
. The first term is the within-subsidiary margin, and the second is the cross-
subsidiary margin. Both margins are examined using the regression (5.5).
The empirical approach can be applied to data on a Southern host country’s multinational
operations. It is desirable that the host country meets the following conditions: (1) being a host
country for multinational production operations in multiple industries for a reasonably long time
span, (2) regularly and consistently reporting subsidiary-level data that are representative of the
multinational operations, and (3) reporting corresponding data with information on industrial
classification, value-added, value of output and other industrial characteristics. It is ideal to use
data on developing host countries that have abundant production factors and that host relatively
large volumes of multinational operations – according to the theory, such countries are relatively
far from their steady states in global production and thus the patterns can be easily detected. In
the following section, I provide an empirical investigation using this approach with data from China
on multinational operations there.
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5.3 Data Description
The dataset used covers the population of large- and medium-sized industrial enterprises in
China with annual revenues of five million RMB or more2 , for a 10-year time span between 1998-
2007. It is from the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) conducted by the National Bureau
of Statistics of China, which is the main source of the industrial section of the China Statistical
Yearbooks. Firms covered in ASIF account for more than 90 percent of the total industrial output
and more than 70 percent of the industrial workforce of China.3 The ASIF reports different types
of firms such as state, private, and foreign firms. The foreign classification is further categorized by
source of fund and ownership. Firms categorized as wholly foreign-owned (non-HMT4 ) enterprises
are drawn from ASIF and defined as multinational subsidiaries here. Table 5.1 presents the sum-
mary statistics for multinational subsidiaries. During the 10 years covered, there were significant
growths in multinational operations as indicated by the statistics. Their share of output in the
whole manufacturing sector of China almost quadrupled from 1998 to 2007; the share of export
almost tripled; and their mean VR rose from 0.265 to 0.301, a 13.6% increase over the 10 years.
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics of Multinational Subsidiaries
Year Output Value-Added VA/Output Ratio Export
Mean S.D. Share Mean S.D. Share Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Share
1998 79.64 516.92 3.13 18.51 119.90 2.47 0.265 0.161 50.36 250.83 12.30
1999 89.55 517.03 3.74 21.55 114.33 3.00 0.266 0.145 55.19 266.47 14.45
2000 109.30 650.07 4.60 27.66 177.61 3.88 0.277 0.15 65.09 305.54 16.00
2001 112.25 745.81 5.29 28.53 217.11 4.52 0.281 0.146 65.45 435.58 18.10
2002 129.44 961.53 6.34 32.03 253.44 5.23 0.283 0.151 79.82 703.03 21.55
2003 152.86 1,150 7.64 35.53 172.59 6.02 0.288 0.148 91.83 1,010 24.16
2004 143.79 1,160 9.49 32.67 218.91 7.61 0.286 0.169 90.00 980 29.51
2005 180.09 1,560 9.93 44.75 291.42 8.53 0.298 0.163 100.17 920 28.93
2006 208.53 1,770 10.68 52.40 353.12 9.27 0.304 0.163 121.08 1,550 32.01
2007 232.32 2010 11.05 54.551 292.73 9.21 0.301 0.16 133.39 1870 33.7
Nominal values are in current price RMB and the unit is 1 million.
Columns labeled “Share” refer to the share within the whole manufacturing sector of China.
2 It approximately equals US$600,000 for the time period covered.
3 See Brandt et al. (2012) for a more detailed and comprehensive discussion.
4 HMT stands for Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.
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Figure 5.1 plots the trend of VR during the time span covered, with all four-digit indus-
tries pooled together. It can be told from the graph that the Chinese multinational operations
experienced positive overall growth trend during the ten years.
Figure 5.1: Value-Added/Output Ratio Growth in China: Multinational Operations
With regard to the components of VR changes, the decomposition method (5.6) is applied to
identify the within-subsidiary margin and the cross-subsidiary margin. The decomposition can be
performed at any aggregate level of industry and for any time span. Figure 5.2 demonstrates the
decomposition results of the VR changes at the two-digit industry level over the 10 years covered.
From the figure, the within-subsidiary margin appears to be the main source of VR changes.
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Figure 5.2: Decomposition of ∆VR: Two-Digit Industries, 10-Year Change
Note: See Table 5.3 for industry classification and description.
The decomposition is further conducted at the four-digit industry level and with a two-year
time span. Table 5.2 presents a snapshot of the average change in VR over time and the two margins
obtained from decomposition. The within-subsidiary margin dominates the cross-subsidiary margin
and appears to be the main source of overall industrial VR change in all years here. In the following
section, further investigations are performed using regression analyses.
5.4 Empirical Results
Given industry i and year τ , the dependent variable in (5.5) can be the total change in
VRi,τ , the within-subsidiary margin
∑
j∈Ωi ∆VRj,τ
(
λj,τ+λj,τ−1
2
)
, or the cross-subsidiary margin∑
j∈Ωi ∆λj,τ
(
VRj,τ+VRj,τ−1
2
)
. Table 5.3 provides summary descriptive statistics for the two-digit
manufacturing industries. The control variables included in regression include capital intensity
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Table 5.2: Change in VR and the Two Margins, Four-digit Industries
Year
∆VR Within-Subsidiary Margin Cross-Subsidiary Margin
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
1999 0.0116 0.130 0.0119 0.129 -0.00035 0.0188
2000 0.0094 0.112 0.0101 0.111 -0.00071 0.0171
2001 0.0058 0.102 0.0045 0.104 0.00128 0.0145
2002 0.0090 0.111 0.0089 0.110 0.00009 0.0154
2003 0.0093 0.106 0.0111 0.105 -0.00183 0.0151
2004 -0.0084 0.108 -0.0090 0.108 0.00068 0.0184
2005 0.0052 0.106 0.0069 0.104 -0.00164 0.0189
2006 0.0147 0.090 0.0136 0.089 0.00106 0.0150
2007 -0.0043 0.085 -0.0034 0.082 -0.00091 0.0195
(K/L), measured as the value of fixed asset per worker, and the skill intensity indicator, calculated
as the share of employees with the highest completed education equal to or above the level of junior
college. Training intensity, measured as the ratio of employee-training expense to total value of
output, is included to approximate an industry’s learning ability.
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Table 5.3: Industry Description
Industry code Description
Capital Intensity Training intensity Skill Intensity
(K/L)
(1,000 RMB per
Person)
(Employee Training
Expense/Output)
(Share of Employ-
ees with Education
≥ Junior College)
13 Processing of Farm and Sideline Food 91.67 0.00028 0.124
14 Manufacture of Food Products 89.07 0.00043 0.138
15 Manufacture of Beverages 149.90 0.00044 0.194
17 Manufacture of Textiles 67.97 0.00035 0.061
18 Manufacture of Wearing Apparel, Footwear, Hats and Caps 23.23 0.00036 0.049
19
Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather (Down) and Related
Products
34.72 0.00030 0.054
20
Processing of Wood; Manufacture of Products of Wood,
Bamboo, Rattan, Palm Coir and Articles of Straw
74.90 0.00032 0.092
21 Manufacture of Furniture 51.22 0.00040 0.066
22 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products 116.1 0.00036 0.112
23 Printing and Reproduction of Recorded Media 125.60 0.00069 0.170
24
Manufacture of Sport and Recreational Goods (Sports
Goods, Toys, Musical Instruments and Stationery Goods)
38.90 0.00038 0.078
25
Manufacture of Coke and Refined Petroleum Products;
Manufacture of Nuclear Fuel Products
257.00 0.00042 0.202
26 Manufacture of Chemical Material and Chemical Products 161.90 0.00040 0.180
27
Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals and Medicinal Chemical
Products
120.70 0.00061 0.270
28 Manufacture of Chemical Fiber 231.20 0.00026 0.172
29 Manufacture of Rubber Products 70.46 0.00035 0.087
30 Manufacture of Plastics Products 86.59 0.00031 0.093
31 Manufacture of Other Non-metallic Mineral Products 80.47 0.00044 0.102
32 Ferrous Metal Foundries and Presses 193.30 0.00027 0.136
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Table 5.3 Continued
Industry code Description
Capital Intensity Training intensity Skill Intensity
(K/L)
(1,000 RMB per
Person)
(Employee Training
Expense/Output)
(Share of Employ-
ees with Education
≥ Junior College)
33 Non-ferrous Metal Foundries and Presses 135.40 0.00029 0.156
34 Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products (except machinery and
equipment)
72.63 0.00044 0.104
35 Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery and Equipment n.e.c. 68.22 0.00054 0.161
36 Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery 63.73 0.00063 0.195
37 Manufacture of Transport Equipment 89.14 0.00088 0.184
39 Manufacture of Electrical Equipment 74.74 0.00041 0.154
40 Manufacture of Computer and Electronic Products 120.7 0.00034 0.285
41 Manufacture of Special Instruments and Office Machinery 63.38 0.00068 0.252
42 Manufacture of Art Products; Other Manufacturing 45.43 0.00049 0.093
43 Waste Collection, Treatment and Disposal Activities; Materials
Recovery
92.30 0.00019 0.121
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Table 5.4 reports the regression results from (5.5) with the overall two-year change in VR at
the four-digit industry level as the dependent variable. Column (1) displays the baseline results,
with only the explanatory variables included. The results are in line with the theory predictions.
VR change is larger when the initial VR is lower; it decreases over time; and it is higher in industries
with higher training intensities. In Column (2), a control variable – capital intensity – is included
into the regression. The results display similar pattern as in the baseline case, and industries with
higher capital intensities tend to show higher growth in VR. Skill intensity is further included as
another control variable with results presented in Column (3). Again, results are consistent with
the theoretical predictions.
Table 5.4: Overall ∆VR of Multinational Operation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Non
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample High K/L Low K/L Skill-Intensive Skill-Intensive
Industries Industries Industries Industries
Initial VR -0.0760*** -0.0744*** -0.0743*** -0.0694*** -0.0654*** -0.0711*** -0.0771***
(0.0144) (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0228)
Year Trend -0.00119* -0.00120** -0.00120** -0.00238*** -0.000046 -0.00200** -0.000454
(τ) (0.000608) (0.000607) (0.000608) (0.000899) (0.000822) (0.000945) (0.000787)
Training 23.32*** 24.30*** 24.54*** 34.92** 16.62** 29.23*** 18.40
Intensity (β) (7.506) (7.345) (7.369) (16.09) (6.706) (9.075) (14.44)
Capital 35.99* 37.57* 43.35** 88.07 26.46 109.6
Intensity (19.57) (20.68) (21.18) (190.4) (21.79) (77.33)
Skill -0.00339 -0.00707 -0.0206 -0.00973 -0.164
Intensity (0.0176) (0.0202) (0.0360) (0.0222) (0.119)
Constant 0.0215*** 0.0176*** 0.0178*** 0.0178* 0.0132 0.0211** 0.0260**
(0.00542) (0.00553) (0.00548) (0.0106) (0.00993) (0.0101) (0.0112)
Observations 2,485 2,485 2,485 1,246 1,239 1,192 1,293
R-squared 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.024 0.012 0.018 0.018
Dependent variable is the two-year change in value-added/output ratio (∆VR).
The regression is at the level of (4-digit industry × year) level. 2-digit industry dummies are included.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
In Columns (4) and (5), VR changes are divided into two groups of industries with high and
low capital-labor intensities, respectively.5 The coefficient of time trend τ is insignificant for the
group of industries with low capital intensities, which confirms that capital-intensive industries tend
5 The groups are defined based on their capital intensities: industries in the high- (low-) intensity group are with
capital-labor intensities above (below) the median of the measure.
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to have a more significant time-convergence pattern in VR growth. Column (6) and (7) present
results from regressions dividing industries into groups with different levels of skill intensity.6 For
the highly skill-intensive industries, their growth rate in VR declines faster as time passes than
the non-skill-intensive industries. At the same time, training intensity appears to have a more
significant positive influence on the VR growth of skill-intensive sectors. In all the regressions,
industry-dummies are included to address the issue that there may be industry-specific and non-
time variant characteristics that affect the VR changes over time.7
Table 5.5 examines the within-subsidiary margin of VR change, which is obtained from the
decomposition specified in (5.6). The regression results are similar as in Table 5.4. The within-
Table 5.5: Within-Subsidiary Margin of ∆VR, Multinational Operation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Non
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample High K/L Low K/L Skill-Intensive Skill-Intensive
Industries Industries Industries Industries
Initial VR -0.0690*** -0.0666*** -0.0665*** -0.0629*** -0.0563*** -0.0626*** -0.0670***
(0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0198) (0.0196) (0.0198) (0.0215)
Year Trend -0.00108* -0.00110* -0.00110* -0.00225** 0.00003 -0.00196** -0.000302
(τ) (0.000601) (0.000601) (0.000601) (0.000900) (0.000801) (0.000930) (0.000780)
Training 22.61*** 24.02*** 24.35*** 32.85** 17.00** 28.29*** 23.02
Intensity (β) (7.678) (7.430) (7.380) (15.72) (6.572) (8.914) (15.21)
Capital 51.97*** 54.12*** 57.54*** 99.76 49.20** 119.3
Intensity (18.69) (19.76) (20.26) (182.1) (21.60) (79.26)
Skill -0.00460 0.000622 -0.0368 -0.00487 -0.154
Intensity (0.0170) (0.0200) (0.0362) (0.0218) (0.121)
Constant 0.0198*** 0.0142** 0.0145*** 0.0138 0.0117 0.0159 0.0199*
(0.00545) (0.00558) (0.00556) (0.0104) (0.00985) (0.0102) (0.0114)
Observations 2,485 2,485 2,485 1,246 1,239 1,192 1,293
R-squared 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.023 0.012 0.017 0.016
Dependent variable is the within-subsidiary margin obtained from the decomposition of the two-year change
in value-added/output ratio (∆VR).
The regression is at the level of (4-digit industry × year) level. 2-digit industry dummies are included.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
subsidiary margin displays similar convergence patterns as the overall change in VR, consistent with
the theoretical predictions. The magnitude and the significance level of the coefficient estimates
6 The groups are defined based on their skill intensities: industries in the skill-intensive (non skill-intensive) group
are with skill intensities above (below) the median of the measure.
7 As in the theory presented in Chapter 4, there are time-invariant and industry-specific characteristics that affect
the development of task-offshoring over time (i.e., dz¯(t)
dt
depends also on parameters such as ρ).
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are quite close to those of overall VR changes, and the convergence patterns are more significant
in highly capital-intensive industries and skill-intensive industries.
Table 5.6 shows the regression results for the cross-subsidiary margin from the decomposition.
With regard to the cross-subsidiary margin, it does not show the similar convergence pattern as
Table 5.6: Cross-Subsidiary Margin of ∆VR, Multinational Operation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Non
Full Sample Full Sample Full Sample High K/L Low K/L Skill-Intensive Skill-Intensive
Industries Industries Industries Industries
Initial VR -0.00703** -0.00776** -0.00780** -0.00651 -0.00903 -0.00844* -0.0101*
(0.00357) (0.00342) (0.00342) (0.00416) (0.00668) (0.00479) (0.00570)
Year Trend -0.000108 -0.000102 -0.000102 -0.000128 -0.000077 -0.000039 -0.000152
(τ) (0.000129) (0.000128) (0.000128) (0.000196) (0.000167) (0.000190) (0.000176)
Training 0.712 0.278 0.190 2.074 -0.378 0.937 -4.623
Intensity (β) (1.784) (1.728) (1.822) (3.084) (2.809) (1.913) (6.671)
Capital -15.98*** -16.54*** -14.19* -11.69 -22.74*** -9.719
Intensity (5.789) (5.905) (7.214) (47.15) (6.635) (13.94)
Skill 0.00120 -0.00769 0.0162* -0.00486 -0.0102
Intensity (0.00385) (0.00516) (0.00927) (0.00403) (0.0231)
Constant 0.00165 0.00340** 0.00332** 0.00401 0.00154 0.00521** 0.00609**
(0.00126) (0.00140) (0.00141) (0.00267) (0.00267) (0.00254) (0.00255)
Observations 2,485 2,485 2,485 1,246 1,239 1,192 1,293
R-squared 0.011 0.014 0.014 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.028
Dependent variable is the cross-subsidiary margin obtained from the decomposition of the two-year change
in value-added/output ratio (∆VR).
The regression is at the level of (4-digit industry × year) level. 2-digit industry dummies are included.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
of the overall VR change and of the within-subsidiary margin. The cross-subsidiary margin still
decreases in initial VR, while other coefficient estimates of the explanatory variables do not show
the convergence trend. The magnitude, as well as the significance level, of the estimates is much
smaller than those in Table 5.4 and Table 5.5. It is interesting to see that capital intensity tends
to have a negative effect on cross-subsidiary margin, while the effect is positive for both within-
subsidiary margin and the overall VR change. This may imply that the more capital-intensive an
industry is, the more likely it is the case that the VR growth mainly occurs within subsidiaries.
Comparing the results in Table 5.4 – 5.6, it is found that the within-subsidiary change dom-
inates the cross-subsidiary change and serves as the main driving force of the overall convergence
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of VR of multinational operations. The explanatory power of the independent variables for ∆VR
primarily comes from their explanatory capabilities in addressing the within-subsidiary margin.
This result is consistent with the theory presented in Chapter 4 in the sense that the growth of
industrial VR mainly stems from the within-firm developments. This trend is even more significant
in more capital-intensive industries. Furthermore, the tables report the constant terms from the
regressions. For overall ∆VR and the within-subsidiary margin regressions, the constant estimates
are positive, with most of them are also statistically significant. They are also much larger in
magnitude than those for the cross-subsidiary margin. This indicates that there is a positive VR
development over time which is primarily driven by the within-firm changes.
Specification (5.5) may be affected by the tendency of VR to mechanically revert to its mean,
which may lead to spurious convergence pattern being captured by the results. To address this
issue, regressions are re-conducted with different initial years, i.e., the time trend index τ starts
from other initial years other than 1998, which is the earliest year covered in the dataset and also
the initial year used in the regressions above. The reason is that shocks might hit an industry and
make the VR fluctuate for a short time, but it would not constantly and consistently hit it in the
same manner for years. Table 5.7 presents the results, using 1999, 2001, 2003 and 2005 as the
initial year, respectively. The results show that the convergence pattern displayed are similar to
those in the previous main regressions. This confirms that the results are not due to or significantly
affected by shocks.
In the main regressions shown earlier, skill intensity is measured by the share of employees
with the highest completed education at the junior college level or above. Table 5.8 then displays
the estimation results with skill intensity approximated by different measures. The two alternatives
are the shares of employees with at least college education and with graduate degrees, respectively.
It is seen from the table that the convergence patterns as shown by the estimations are the same
as in the main regressions. The main coefficients’ estimates are quite similar to the main results.
Since the concentration of discussion is mainly on multinational operation, domestic and
local industrial operations can thus serve as groups for counter-checks. Table 5.9 replicates the
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Table 5.7: ∆VR and its Two Margins, Multinational Operations, Various Initial Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Within-Subsid. Cross-Subsid. Within-Subsid. Cross-Subsid.
Variables ∆VR Margin Margin ∆VR Margin Margin
Initial VR: Year 1999 Initial VR: Year 2001
Initial VR -0.107*** -0.106*** -0.00137 -0.105*** -0.0996*** -0.00507
(0.0160) (0.0157) (0.00338) (0.0227) (0.0220) (0.00526)
Year Trend -0.00112 -0.00102 -0.000100 -0.00206* -0.00198* -0.000081
(τ) (0.000710) (0.000704) (0.000139) (0.00111) (0.00110) (0.00022)
Training 23.93** 25.17** -1.246 20.48* 21.76* -1.285
Intensity (β) (9.697) (9.757) (1.658) (11.98) (12.29) (2.116)
Capital 21.17 35.48 -14.31** -3.462 16.59 -20.05***
Intensity (K/L) (26.35) (24.07) (6.341) (27.81) (26.61) (7.549)
Skill -0.0425 -0.0439* 0.00140 -0.0162 -0.0178 0.00163
Intensity (0.0269) (0.0254) (0.00432) (0.0307) (0.0288) (0.00483)
Constant 0.0350*** 0.0329*** 0.00210 0.0401*** 0.0366*** 0.00351
(0.00709) (0.00699) (0.00143) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0022)
R-squared 0.020 0.020 0.013 0.020 0.020 0.013
Initial VR: Year 2003 Initial VR: Year 2005
Initial VR -0.133*** -0.128*** -0.00497 -0.258*** -0.250*** -0.00867
(0.0313) (0.0297) (0.00532) (0.0424) (0.0420) (0.00659)
Year Trend 0.000147 0.000396 -0.000249 -0.0196*** -0.0177*** -0.00195
(τ) (0.00218) (0.00212) (0.000449) (0.00656) (0.00645) (0.00125)
Training 15.17 13.03 2.135 36.61*** 37.82*** -1.217
Intensity (β) (14.88) (15.81) (2.791) (7.839) (7.689) (1.048)
Capital 47.10 57.83* -10.73 -3.093 18.70 -21.79**
Intensity (K/L) (35.39) (31.14) (11.67) (34.89) (34.69) (10.27)
Skill -0.00782 -0.00308 -0.00474 0.0511 0.0417 0.00944
Intensity (0.0329) (0.0313) (0.00682) (0.0373) (0.0376) (0.00661)
Constant 0.0298 0.0259 0.00389 0.224*** 0.204*** 0.0203*
(0.0196) (0.0192) (0.00374) (0.0557) (0.0545) (0.0105)
R-Squared 0.034 0.034 0.019 0.121 0.116 0.036
Specification is the same as column (3) in Tables 5.4 – 5.6.
The regression is at the level of (4-digit industry × year) level. 2-digit industry dummies are included.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
primary regressions on the domestically-funded and the HMT-owned counterparts of MIs. They
are conceptual industries consisting of only domestically-funded and HMT-owned enterprises re-
spectively. The results are quite different from those for multinational operations. The domestic
production does not show a similar convergence pattern, either for the total change in VR or the
within- and cross-firm margins. Particularly, the coefficient estimates on employee training intensity
are negative, which is the opposite of the case of MIs. For HMT-owned operations, the situation
is similar. Except for the initial VR, no other explanatory variable shows significant explanatory
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Table 5.8: ∆VR and its Two Margins, Multinational Operations, Skill Intensity Measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Skill Intensity: Share of Employees Skill Intensity: Share of Employees
with Education ≥ College with Education ≥ Graduate
Dependent Within-Subsid. Cross-Subsid. Within-Subsid. Cross-Subsid.
Variables ∆VR Margin Margin ∆VR Margin Margin
Initial VR -0.0740*** -0.0662*** -0.00774** -0.0740*** -0.0663*** -0.00770**
(0.0143) (0.0141) (0.00342) (0.0143) (0.0141) (0.00344)
Year Trend -0.00120** -0.00110* -0.000102 -0.00120** -0.00110* -0.000102
(τ) (0.000608) (0.000601) (0.000128) (0.000608) (0.000601) (0.000128)
Training 24.79*** 24.48*** 0.304 24.37*** 24.08*** 0.288
Intensity (β) (7.279) (7.343) (1.751) (7.327) (7.414) (1.727)
Capital 39.81** 55.59*** -15.78*** 36.79* 52.66*** -15.87***
Intensity (K/L) (20.04) (19.00) (5.870) (19.65) (18.74) (5.805)
Skill -0.0183 -0.0173 -0.000971 -0.0518 -0.0446 -0.00721
Intensity (0.0190) (0.0187) (0.00411) (0.0417) (0.0423) (0.0101)
Constant 0.0178*** 0.0144*** 0.00341** 0.0176*** 0.0142** 0.00340**
(0.00548) (0.00555) (0.00140) (0.00553) (0.00558) (0.00139)
R-squared 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014
Specification is the same as column (3) in Tables 5.4 – 5.6.
The regression is at the level of (4-digit industry × year) level. 2-digit industry dummies are included.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
powers. Compared with domestic firms, the HMT-owned production displays patterns closer to the
multinational operations, which may indicate that it is in character more similar to multinational
subsidiaries. For both types of production, it is the within-firm margin that dominates as the main
source of change in overall VR.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
The theory of global value chain presented in previous chapters has a key and critical predic-
tion as to how the Southern host country’s share of industrial value added behaves over time: its
dynamics essentially follows a convergence pattern similar to the evolution path of the offshoring
threshold. The VR of a multinational industry in a Southern host country will grow at a decreasing
speed, as predicted. Using subsidiary-level data on Chinese multinational operations, the prediction
is empirically investigated in this chapter.
The empirical results show evidence supporting the theoretical predictions. The multinational
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Table 5.9: ∆VR and its Two Margins, Local Production and HMT-Owned Operations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestically-Funded Production HMT-Owned Production
Dependent Within-Firm Cross-Firm Within-Firm Cross-Firm
Variables ∆VR Margin Margin ∆VR Margin Margin
Initial VR -0.0279** -0.0205 -0.00739* -0.0873*** -0.0849*** -0.00240
(0.0141) (0.0151) (0.00438) (0.0129) (0.0121) (0.00408)
Year Trend 0.0000995 -0.000159 0.000258*** 0.000926 0.000743 0.000183
(τ) (0.000211) (0.000203) (0.0000596) (0.000661) (0.000658) (0.000137)
Training -13.54** -12.41* -1.135 3.119 3.938 -0.819
Intensity (β) (5.898) (6.349) (0.773) (6.773) (6.401) (1.852)
Capital -10.89 -10.14 -0.749 -33.25 -39.21 5.960
Intensity (K/L) (10.65) (8.999) (4.355) (32.22) (32.88) (5.808)
Skill 0.0178** 0.0198** -0.00200 0.0596*** 0.0615*** -0.00186
Intensity (0.00813) (0.00773) (0.00256) (0.0216) (0.0219) (0.00537)
Constant 0.0125*** 0.0103*** 0.00225 0.0149*** 0.0150*** -0.0000722
(0.00341) (0.00370) (0.00142) (0.00537) (0.00527) (0.00121)
Observations 3,777 3,777 3,777 2,521 2,521 2,521
R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.019 0.021 0.022 0.008
Specification is the same as column (3) in Tables 5.4 – 5.6.
The regression is at the level of (4-digit industry × year) level. 2-digit industry dummies are included.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
subsidiaries in China experience VR growth during the time period covered in the dataset, at a
declining pace. The employee training intensity of an industry has a significant positive effect on VR
growth. The results are robust to different choices of initial years and control variables’ measures.
A similar convergence pattern is not found when I perform regression using the same specification
on domestic and HMT-owned operations. Certainly, it is ideal that the empirical investigation is
performed at the task level, i.e., the observations are tasks conducted within subsidiaries. While
task-level data are difficult to obtain and not widely available, in this chapter firm-level data are
examined to the best exertion.
Chapter 6
An Extenstion: Multinational Production, Innovation, and
the Dynamics of Task Allocation
In the basic model presented in Chapter 3, the technologically advanced country serves as the
learning boundary, which does not change over time. Recently, there is a rising phenomenon catch-
ing people’s attention – “reshoring,” which refers to the trend that previously offshored activities
are now moved back to their originating home countries. One important driving force behind this
occurrence is that the technologically developed home countries improve their production efficiency
over time, which gradually makes it more economic to conduct even the low-end activities back
there. Therefore, this chapter considers the task-allocation dynamics in global production with
technology innovation in the North incorporated.
In this theoretical extension of the basic model, while the South learns by carrying out tasks
beyond its capability, the North keeps innovating. The technologies in the developed country keep
being improved – the technology frontier and learning boundary of the world keeps being pushed
forward. The task allocation pattern at any point of time depends on countries’ relative cost of
conducting each activity. The dynamics of global production are thus critically determined by
the two countries’ relative speed of technology improvement – one through learning and the other
through innovation. Under this framework, both offshoring expansion and reshoring may occur.
This chapter mainly discusses the task-allocation dynamics under different circumstances
of technology improvement interaction between countries. It is organized as follows. In Section
6.1, I introduce the environment and set-up of the model. Section 6.2 studies the instantaneous
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equilibrium of multinational production. The dynamics of task allocation are discussed in Section
6.3 and 6.4, for an initially efficient and inefficient South, respectively. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.1 Set-up of the Model
The environment is the same as in the basic model introduced in Chapter 3. There are two
countries: North (N) and South (S), with one industry producing a final product Y and supplying
it to both countries’ consumers, with no trade cost. Consumer preferences are the same in the
two countries. Labor is the only factor of production, which is inelastically supplied and immobile
across countries. The labor endowment of country i is denoted by Li, and it is constant over time.
Time is continuous and indexed by t. The environment is perfectly competitive.
6.1.1 Production
As in the basic model, the production of Y requires the completion of a continuum of tasks,
indexed by z ∈ [0, 1]. The value of z indicates the technological sophistication of a task. The
production function of Y at any time t is expressed as:
lnY (t) =
∫ 1
0
lnx(z, t)dz, (6.1)
where x(z, t) is the amount of task z completed at time t. Each task can be carried out in either
country with constant returns to scale.
Initially at t = 0, the North can perform any task with the best technology available at that
time. The unit labor requirement for conducting a task z in the North at t = 0 is given by
aN (z, 0) = a¯e
−z, (6.2)
where a¯ > 0 is a parameter. The South, in contrast, has the best technology in use initially only
for some low-sophistication tasks. Specifically, let T (0) denote the efficiency frontier of technology
in the South at t = 0, with 0 < T (0) < 1. For the simple tasks with z ≤ T (0), the South’s
production technologies are as good as the North’s. For the complicated ones with z > T (0), the
92
Southern technologies are less efficient, and the more sophisticated a task is, the further the South
lags behind. Specifically, the unit labor requirement for conducting a task z at t = 0 in the South
is given by
aS(z, 0) =

aN (z, 0) = a¯e
−z if z ≤ T (0) ,
a¯ez−2T (0) if z > T (0) .
(6.3)
6.1.2 Innovation
The North keeps improving its production technologies through innovation. The resulting
effect is the continuous productivity enhancement in the country for all tasks. It is assumed that
the unit labor requirement for conducting task z at time t in the North is expressed as
aN (z, t) = a¯e
−z−αt, (6.4)
with parameter α > 0. The innovation speed is implied as ∂aN (·,t)/∂taN (·,t) = −α, which is the pace of
reduction in the unit labor requirement over time, constant across all tasks.
6.1.3 Learning-by-Doing
Tasks may be conducted in either country. Because of the cost-minimization incentive, certain
activities are offshored to the South, starting from the simplest ones for which the South has the
best technologies initially. Through conducting the offshored activities, the South may improve
its own technologies through the learning-by-doing effect. Particularly, the country accumulates
experience and enhances production efficiency by conducting the “beyond” tasks on which it lags
behind the North. Furthermore, it is assumed that the learning effect is bounded with spillovers
across tasks, with the Northern unit labor requirement schedule serving as the learning boundary.
Specifically, the South experiences gradual reduction in its unit labor requirement:
∂aS(·, t)/∂t
aS(·, t) = −
∫ 1
0
2β
{
1
∣∣∣∣ aS(z, t)aN (z, t+ ) > 1
}
LS(z, t) dz , (6.5)
where
{
1
∣∣∣ aS(z,t)aN (z,t+) > 1} is an indicator function whose value equals 1 if there is still room for the
South to improve its technology for task z at time t, and it equals 0 otherwise ( > 0 is infinitely
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small); LS(z, t) denotes the amount of labor used for carrying out task z in the South at time t;
and β > 0 is a parameter implying the learning ability of the South. The basic idea is that while
the North keeps improving technologies for every task, the world’s production efficiency frontier
continues moving forward, which may lead the South to keep trying catching up with the North.
At the same time, the learning effect has a boundary. It is assumed that the North always
has the best technologies, and the South is not able to achieve better than the North at any time.
Hence, the Northern efficiency function always serves as the boundary of Southern learning.
Examining the learning function (6.5), it is found that with the constant Northern technology
improvement, the Southern learning effect is essentially given by
∂aS(·, t)/∂t
aS(·, t) = −
∫ 1
0
2β × 1 × LS(z, t) dz = −2βLS , (6.5′)
when aS(z, t) ≥ aN (z, t), and if the South does conduct some tasks at time t. Intuitively, while
the North keeps innovating on all technologies, the South only learns from the North. As a result,
there always exists room for the South to learn the most up-to-date technologies. The learning
effect reveals the possibility that a host country may improve its own technologies constantly by
conducting offshored tasks, and all resources devoted contribute to technology improvement.
With Northern innovation and Southern learning, the pattern of how the productivity sched-
ules may evolve over time depends on the interaction between the two. There are three possible
cases with regard to the relationship between innovation and learning:
• Case I. Northern Innovation Pace = Southern Learning Pace (α = 2βLS)
• Case II. Northern Innovation Pace > Southern Learning Pace (α > 2βLS)
• Case III. Northern Innovation Pace < Southern Learning Pace (α < 2βLS)
The dynamics of task allocation vary upon different circumstances. I will examine each case in
detail in later discussions.
All tasks, wherever allocated, are conducted using the local unit labor requirement schedules.
In this model with perfectly competitive environment, tasks are undertaken with constant returns
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to scale. Therefore, firms do not have a substantial role here from the theoretical perspective.
6.2 Instantaneous Equilibrium of Multinational Production
6.2.1 Instantaneous Equilibrium
Let wi(t) denote the wage rate in coutry i at time t. The unit cost functions for conducting
a task z in the two countries are, respectively,
CS(wS(t), z) = wS(t)aS(z, t) , (6.6)
CN (wN (t), z) = wN (t)aN (z, t) . (6.7)
A certain range of tasks are offshored to the South, starting from the simplest ones, since the South
has the most advanced technologies for them initially. The cost conditions (6.6) and (6.7) combine
to form a no-arbitrage condition of offshoring, determining the pattern of task allocation between
countries. There exists a threshold task z¯(t) at time t such that CS(wS(t), z) = CN (wN (t), z) in
equilibrium, i.e.,
wS(t) aS(z¯(t), t) = wN (t) aN (z¯(t), t) , (6.8)
where z¯(t) > 0 is the most sophisticated task that is performed in the South. The tasks beyond
z¯(t) are conducted in the North.
The labor-market clearing conditions in the two countries at time t are:
South :
∫ z¯(t)
0
xS(z, t)aS(z, t)dz = LS , (6.9)
North :
∫ 1
z¯(t)
xN (z, t)aN (z, t)dz = LN , (6.10)
where xi(z, t) denotes the amount of task z conducted in country i at time t.
Similar as in Chapter 3, let E(t) denote the world expenditure on the final consumer product
Y at time t, defined as the sum of factor payments in the two economies:
E(t) = wS(t)LS + wN (t)LN . (6.11)
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Then the demand for a task z conducted in country i at time t is
xi(z, t) =
E(t)
Ci(wi(t), z)
, i ∈ {N,S} . (6.12)
With the unit cost functions (6.6) and (6.7), together with (6.12), the labor-market clearing condi-
tions are simplified to
South :
∫ z¯(t)
0
E(t)
wS(t)
dz = LS , (6.9
′)
North :
∫ 1
z¯(t)
E(t)
wN (t)
dz = LN . (6.10
′)
Therefore, the instantaneous equilibrium at any time t is characterized by the offshoring
threshold determination condition (6.8), the labor-market clearing conditions (6.9′) and (6.10′),
and the world expenditure expression (6.11). I normalize world expenditure at unity by Walras’
Law: E(t) = 1, and hereby wage rates are thus measured as shares of world factor income.
6.2.2 The Wage-Equalization Threshold
There exists a threshold task z∗, such that if all tasks with z ∈ [0, z∗] are offshored to the
South, and all tasks with z ∈ (z∗, 1] are conducted in the North, the two countries’ wage rates are
equalized. From conditions (6.9′) and (6.10′), this wage-equalization threshold task z∗ is
z∗ =
LS
LS + LN
. (6.13)
This wage-equalization threshold task z∗ is critical for analyzing the equilibrium dynamics.
On one hand, it determines whether the host country receives “beyond” tasks to conduct when
offshoring begins. If it is lower than the initial Southern technology stock (z∗ < T (0)), the North
will not offshore more than z∗ (thus no more than T (0)) tasks to the South. However, if z∗ > T (0),
the North may offshore more than T (0) tasks, and thus the South conducts activities that it is not
good at, at the initial time. On the other hand, the position of z∗ significantly influences how task
allocation evolves over time. My discussion thus will proceed with two possible cases:
• Case I. The South is relatively efficient initially: z∗ ≤ T (0);
• Case II. The South is relatively inefficient initially: z∗ > T (0).
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6.3 The Evolution Dynamics: An Initially Efficient South
This is the case where the South is relatively capable in terms of production efficiency:
z∗ ≤ T (0). In this situation, all low-sophistication tasks below z∗ will be offshored to the South
initially. All tasks thus are conducted using the best available technologies. The initial equilibrium
is characterized by the following:
wS(0) a¯e
−z¯(0) = wN (0) a¯e−z¯(0) , (6.14)∫ z¯(0)
0
1
wS(0)
dz = LS , (6.15)∫ 1
z¯(0)
1
wN (0)
dz = LN . (6.16)
Given the conditions, the task threshold of offshoring z¯(0) and wage rates are given by, respectively,
z¯(0) = z∗ =
LS
LS + LN
, (6.17)
wS(0) = wN (0) = w
∗ =
1
LS + LN
. (6.18)
6.3.1 Evolution Dynamics: Equal Paces of Technological Progress
When the technological progresses in the two countries are at the same pace (α = 2βLS),
the efficiency gap between the two countries’ technologies will not be changing over time. With the
learning function (6.5′), at any time t, the Southern unit labor requirement schedule is given by
aS(z, t) =

aN (z, t) = a¯e
−z−αt if z ≤ T (0) ,
a¯ez−2T (0)−αt if z > T (0) .
(6.19)
This indicates that the relative efficiency of conducting tasks is:
aS(z, t)
aN (z, t)
=

1 if z ≤ T (0) ,
e2z−2T (0) if z > T (0) ,
(6.20)
which keeps the same over time.
Given the fact the relative efficiency schedule does not change, the task allocation pattern
also stays the same as initially. When both countries are improving their technologies at the same
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pace, the countries’ comparative advantages in terms of task-conduct do not change, which leads
to an overall static equilibrium in this case:
z¯(t) = z∗ =
LS
LS + LN
, (6.21)
wS(t) = wN (t) = w
∗ =
1
LS + LN
. (6.22)
Figure 6.1 shows this situation graphically.
Figure 6.1: Dynamics of Task Offshoring: an Initially Efficient South, Equal Paces of
Technological Progress (z∗ ≤ T (0), α = 2βLS)
0 1
Unit Labor 
Requirement
z
North at t=0
South at t=0
South at t>0
North at t>0
T(t) = T(0)z(t) = z*
6.3.2 Evolution Dynamics: Fast Northern Innovation
This is the situation where the initially technologically developed country pushes the world’s
technology frontier faster than the Southern learning pace: α > 2βLS . Therefore, the Southern
learning under this circumstance will not be bounded – the South will not be able to catch up with
the North. Specifically, the unit labor requirement schedule of the South is:
aS(z, t) =

a¯e−z−2βLSt if z ≤ T (0) ,
a¯ez−2T (0)−2βLSt if z > T (0) .
(6.23)
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The technological difference between the countries becomes increasingly significant over time:
aS(z, t)
aN (z, t)
=

e(α−2βLS)t if z ≤ T (0) ,
e2z−2T (0)+(α−2βLS)t if z > T (0) .
(6.24)
Reshoring Behavior With the productivity schedules, the conditions for instantaneous
equilibrium (6.8), (6.9′) and (6.10′) after the initial time period boil down to
e(α−2βLS)t =
1− z¯(t)
z¯(t)
× LS
LN
, (6.25)
wS(t) =
z¯(t)
LS
, (6.26)
wN (t) =
1− z¯(t)
LN
. (6.27)
Comparing the two task-threshold determination functions at t = 0 vs. t > 0 ((6.17) vs. (6.25)), it
is easy to find that with fast Northern innovation, at any t > 0, it is the case that less than z∗ tasks
are offshored: z¯(t) < z¯(0) = z∗. Here a potential assumption is that task allocation is sticky: the
progress of offshoring keeps the set of tasks offshored as close as that in the previous time period.
This is consistent with the common observations in real business, where sharp and significant shifts
of the offshoring pattern seldom occur.
Therefore, with the widening of the technological gap between countries, fewer than z¯(0) tasks
are allocated to the South. Productivity growth arising from innovation alleviates the reliance of
multinational production on the South for production. Over time, with both Southern learning
and Northern innovation, global production evolves. Particularly, while the South lags increasingly
further behind, the Southern coverage of tasks shrinks, including fewer sophisticated tasks. This
can been seen by examining (6.25):1
dz¯(t)
dt
< 0 , (6.28)
The task offshoring threshold gradually lowers over time. After initial offshoring, with fast
Northern innovation, tasks that were originally offshored are moved back to the North, starting
1 From (6.25), z¯(t) = LS
LS+LNe
(α−2βLS)t , which monotonically decreases in t with α > 2βLS .
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from those relatively sophisticated ones. The “reshoring” trend thus occurs. This can be seen
graphically in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: Dynamics of Task Offshoring: an Initially Efficient South, Fast Northern Innovation
(z∗ ≤ T (0), α > 2βLS)
0 1
Unit Labor 
Requirement
z
North at t=0
South at t=0
South at t>0
North at t>0
T(0)z(t) z(0)
z*
How fast the reshoring behavior will proceed depends on the two countries’ difference in their
domestic paces of technology progress. From (6.25), it is found that a constant threshold, 12 , serves
as the threshold of sign-change of d
2z¯(t)
dt2
. When more than half of the tasks are offshored to the
South, the reshoring speed is increasingly fast; when less than half of the tasks are offshored, the
reshoring speed decreases. In functional form, it can be expressed as:2
d2z¯(t)
dt2

< 0 when z¯(t) > 12 ,
= 0 when z¯(t) = 12 ,
> 0 when z¯(t) < 12 .
(6.29)
Over time, the offshoring threshold converges to: limt→+∞ z¯(t) = 0. Certainly, the threshold
z¯(t) will not really touch 0, and the progress mainly indicates that the range of tasks that are
offshored will be shrinking over time, with the South increasingly only focusing on the simplest
2 See Appendix C.1 for the derivation.
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activities. Figure 6.3 illustrates two possible evolution paths of the reshoring behavior. In Panel
A, the initial threshold z¯(0) = z∗ is above 12 . Given the definition of z
∗, (6.13), this situation
essentially indicates a large South: LS > LN . Therefore, this evolution pattern is likely to occur
when the South is both large and initially efficient. In Panel B, offshoring starts with z¯(0) < 12 ,
which is likely to be case when the South is relatively small: LS < LN . This story illustrates
Figure 6.3: Evolution of Offshoring Threshold: An Initially Efficient South, Fast Northern
Innovation (z∗ ≤ T (0), α > 2βLS)
(a) Panel A: A Relatively Large South: 12 < z
∗ ≤ T (0)
0
z(t)
t
z*
1/2
(b) Panel A: A Relatively Small South: z∗ < 12
0
z(t)
t
z*
1/2
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that with technology progressing faster in the home country, the learning effect in the South is not
adequate to enable the host country to receive more tasks to conduct. It is the relative technology
advantage/disadvantage that determines the offshoring pattern.
6.3.3 Evolution Dynamics: Fast Southern Learning
With fast Southern learning (2βLS > α), the technological gap between the two economies
closes over time – the host country catches up with the home country gradually. It is assumed
that during this process, the Northern schedule serves as the learning boundary. The Southern
technologies do not get better than the corresponding Northern ones at any point of time. After
the initial time period, considering the productivity schedules (6.3) and (6.4), and learning function
(6.5′), together with the condition α < 2βLS , the unit labor requirement in the South is given by
aS(z, t) =

aN (z, t) = a¯e
−z−αt if z ≤ T (t) = T (0) + (βLS − α2 )t ,
a¯ez−2T (0)−2βLSt if z > T (t) = T (0) + (βLS − α2 )t .
(6.30)
It thus is the case that the Southern stock of technology (T (t)) moves towards more sophisticated
tasks over time, i.e., the South is getting the most advanced technologies for increasingly more
difficult tasks. The technological gap between countries gradually diminishes:
aS(z, t)
aN (z, t)
=

1 if z ≤ T (t) = T (0) + (βLS − α2 )t ,
e2z−2T (0)+(α−2βLS)t if z > T (t) = T (0) + (βLS − α2 )t .
(6.31)
It is obvious that countries’ efficiency gap of conducting all tasks will be closing over time, with
faster Southern learning, 2βLS > α.
While the technology stock in the South, T (t), shifts to the right, it thus is the case that
z∗ ≤ T (0) < T (t) when t > 0. Therefore, following the same logic as when discussing the initial
equilibrium at the beginning of this section, it is easy to tell that under this situation, z¯(t) = z¯(0) =
z∗. No more than z∗ tasks will be offshored as it will not be cost-minimizing, even if the South
has increasingly better technologies. The reason is that although the South learns faster than the
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North innovates, the country’s comparative advantage on the offshored tasks does not change over
time. The effect of learning is reflected in the relative potential efficiency improvement on those
high-end tasks which are not offshored. Therefore, the actual offshoring pattern stays static. While
the South is catching up with the North, it will always receive the most it can. Figure 6.4 displays
the situation graphically.
Figure 6.4: Dynamics of Task Offshoring: an Initially Efficient South, Fast Southern Learning
(z∗ ≤ T (0), α < 2βLS)
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The three cases discussed in this section are likely to occur when the host country is small
but technologically efficient. The limitation of resource endowment in the South is a critical factor
leading to the situation that no more than initial offshoring will happen, in all three cases. With
Northern innovation, the South needs to try to catch up with the world technology improvement
in order to keep its comparative advantages in task production.
6.4 The Evolution Dynamics: An Initially Inefficient South
For many developing host countries participating in multinational production, their advan-
tages are not in technology but in factor supply – they have enough labor resources for production
but not enough advanced technologies. This is the case that z∗ > T (0). Under this situation, fol-
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lowing the same logic as discussed in the corresponding section of Chapter 3, the initial offshoring
threshold z¯(0) lies between the Southern technology stock indicator T (0) and the wage-equalization
point z∗: z¯(0) ∈ (T (0), z∗).
Given conditions (6.2), (6.3), (6.8), (6.9′) and (6.10′), the initial equilibrium (t = 0) is
characterized by
e2z¯(0)−2T (0) =
1− z¯(0)
z¯(0)
× LS
LN
, (6.32)
wS(0) =
z¯(0)
LS
, (6.33)
wN (0) =
1− z¯(0)
LN
. (6.34)
The initial equilibrium is essentially the same as the corresponding one discussed in Chapter 3.
6.4.1 Evolution Dynamics: Equal Paces of Technological Progress
With the Southern learning pace equal to the Northern innovation speed, the two countries’
relative technology difference will not change over time. As discussed in Section 6.3.1, with the
condition α = 2βLS ,
aS(z, t) =

aN (z, t) = a¯e
−z−αt if z ≤ T (0) ,
a¯ez−2T (0)−αt if z > T (0) .
(6.35)
The two countries’ relative efficiency of conducting tasks thus is:
aS(z, t)
aN (z, t)
=

1 if z ≤ T (0) ,
e2z−2T (0) if z > T (0) ,
(6.36)
which keeps the same over time.
The relative efficiency schedule determines how tasks are allocated between countries. With
equal speeds of technology progress, the Southern technology stock indicator will not shift – T (0)
is always the most sophisticated task that the South can perform as efficiently as the North. Thus,
with z∗ > T (0), the offshoring threshold at any time period is always in between: T (0) < z¯(t) < z∗.
Particularly, by examining the equilibrium conditions, together with the productivity schedules, it
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is found that at any time, the equilibrium is characterized by essentially the same conditions as the
initial case:
e2z¯(t)−2T (0) =
1− z¯(t)
z¯(t)
× LS
LN
, (6.37)
wS(t) =
z¯(t)
LS
, (6.38)
wN (t) =
1− z¯(t)
LN
. (6.39)
Therefore, the task offshoring thus the multinational production organization keeps the same as
the initial situation, i.e., a static equilibrium over time:
z¯(t) = z¯(0) ∈ (T (0), z∗) , ∀t , (6.40)
wS(t) = wS(0) ,∀t , (6.41)
wN (t) = wN (0) ,∀t . (6.42)
This situation is graphically illustrated in Figure 6.5.
Figure 6.5: Dynamics of Task Offshoring: an Initially Inefficient South, Equal Paces of
Technological Progress (z∗ > T (0), α = 2βLS)
0 1
Unit Labor 
Requirement
z
North at t=0
South at t=0
South at t>0
North at t>0
T(t) = T(0) z*z(t) = z(0)
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6.4.2 Evolution Dynamics: Fast Northern Innovation
As discussed earlier in the chapter, when the North is able to push the world technology
frontier faster than the South can catch up (α > 2βLS), the efficiency gap between countries
widens over time. The developing country will be increasingly lagging behind, although it is also
improving. At t > 0, the unit labor requirement schedule of the South is:
aS(z, t) =

a¯e−z−2βLSt if z ≤ T (0) ,
a¯ez−2T (0)−2βLSt if z > T (0) .
(6.43)
The technological gap between the countries widens over time:
aS(z, t)
aN (z, t)
=

e(α−2βLS)t if z ≤ T (0) ,
e2z−2T (0)+(α−2βLS)t if z > T (0) .
(6.44)
After the countries start establishing the multinational production chain at t = 0, within a
certain time period, the offshoring threshold z¯(t) is still within the interval (T (0), z∗). During this
time period, the equilibrium is characterized by
e2z¯(t)−2T (0)+(α−2βLS)t =
1− z¯(t)
z¯(t)
× LS
LN
, (6.45)
wS(t) =
z¯(t)
LS
, (6.46)
wN (t) =
1− z¯(t)
LN
. (6.47)
Comparing the task threshold determination conditions at t > 0 vs. at t = 0 ((6.45) vs. (6.32)),
together with the condition that α > 2βLS , it is easy to tell that the offshoring threshold in the
following time period, z¯(t), shifts towards less-sophisticated tasks: z¯(t) < z¯(0). Therefore, with
the increasingly wide technological gap between countries, multinationals tend to move previously
offshored tasks back to the home country. Although during the process, the wage rate in the South
is always lower than in the North (wS(t) < wN (t))
3 , reshoring behavior still occurs. The developing
country’s labor cost advantage is not adequate to attract more offshoring. In contrast, although it
3 This can be told by comparing (6.46) and (6.47), together with the condition that z¯(t) < z∗ = LS
LS+LN
.
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costs higher in the developed country to hire workers, the technology advantage there attracts more
activities to return. Anecdotal evidence has shown that multinational firms invest in reshoring in
recent years, even though host countries’ unit labor costs are lower than home countries’. Such
stories and observations are consistent with the analysis presented here – with better technologies
and continuous improvement, the developed countries may enjoy more manufacturing activities
being relocated back.
After a certain time period, the offshoring threshold z¯(t) moves down to T (0). After that, as
the efficiency gap between the countries continues widening, the reshoring behavior will continue.
That is, the South starts only conducting the tasks that it is relatively good at. The first condition
characterizing the equilibrium – the threshold determination condition – thus changes to:
e(α−2βLS)t =
1− z¯(t)
z¯(t)
× LS
LN
. (6.48)
As time passes, with high innovation pace in the North, the scope of tasks that are conducted in
the South shrinks. During the whole process, reshoring persists. The situation can be graphically
shown in Figure 6.6.
Figure 6.6: Dynamics of Task Offshoring: an Initially Inefficient South, Fast Northern Innovation
(z∗ > T (0), α > 2βLS)
0 1
Unit Labor 
Requirement
z
North at t=0
South at t=0
South at t>0
North at t>0
T(t) = T(0) z(t) z(0) z*
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Reshoring Behavior Examining the reshoring behavior in the two stages respectively, it
is found that before the offshoring threshold goes below T (0), the following pattern applies:4
dz¯(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
T (0)≤z¯(t)<z∗
= −(α− 2βLS)× z¯(t) (1− z¯(t))
1 + 2z¯(t) (1− z¯(t)) < 0 , (6.49)
d2z¯(t)
dt2
∣∣∣∣
T (0)≤z¯(t)<z∗

< 0 when z¯(t) > 12 ,
= 0 when z¯(t) = 12 ,
> 0 when z¯(t) < 12 .
(6.50)
After the offshoring threshold goes below T (0), the situation will follow a similar pattern as dis-
cussed in Section 6.3.2, where the offshoring threshold is below the initial technology stock in the
South, T (0), with the Northern innovation speed faster than that in the South. Technically, this
can be seen by comparing the equilibrium conditions (6.48) and (6.25). Therefore, following the
same logic, in this stage, the reshoring behavior is characterized by
dz¯(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
z¯(t)≤T (0)<z∗
< 0 , (6.51)
d2z¯(t)
dt2
∣∣∣∣
z¯(t)≤T (0)<z∗

< 0 when z¯(t) > 12 ,
= 0 when z¯(t) = 12 ,
> 0 when z¯(t) < 12 .
(6.52)
At z¯(t) = T (0), dz¯(t)dt is not continuous.
5 When time goes infinite, the technology gap also goes
infinite, which leads to limt→+∞ z¯(t) = 0.
Figure 6.7 displays a couple possible evolution paths of the reshoring behavior for a relatively
large South: LS > LN thus z
∗ > 12 . Panel A shows the case where the South has a relatively large
technology stock at the beginning: 12 < T (0) < z
∗. In Panel B, the initial stock of technology in
the South is relatively small: T (0) < 12 < z¯(0) < z
∗. In Figure 6.8, the South is relatively small in
terms of labor endowment: LS < LN . Therefore, the wage equalization point z
∗ < 12 .
4 The expression for dz¯(t)
dt
is from examining (6.45). See Appendix C.2.1 for the derivation of d
2z¯(t)
dt2
.
5 From (6.49), dz¯(t)
dt
|−z¯(t)=T (0) = − (α−2βLS)×T (0)(1−T (0))1+2T (0)(1−T (0)) ; From (6.48), dz¯(t)dt |+z¯(t)=T (0) = −(α−2βLS)T (0)(1−T (0)).
Therefore, dz¯(t)
dt
|−z¯(t)=T (0) > dz¯(t)dt |+z¯(t)=T (0).
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Figure 6.7: Evolution of Offshoring Threshold: A Large and Initially Inefficient South, Fast
Northern Innovation (LS > LN , z
∗ > T (0), α > 2βLS)
(a) Panel A: A High Stock of Technology in the South:
1
2 < T (0) < z
∗
0
z(t)
t
1/2
T(0)
z(0)
(b) Panel B: A Low Stock of Technology in the South:
T (0) < 12 < z¯(0) < z
∗
0
z(t)
t
1/2
T(0)
z(0)
When the developed country keeps technology improvement faster than the South can catch
up with, reshoring behavior leads to fewer tasks being offshored. Tasks are moved back to the home
country, even though the factor price is higher there during the whole process. This demonstrates
the possibility that technology advantages can make up for the factor cost disadvantages.
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Figure 6.8: Evolution of Offshoring Threshold: A Small and Initially Inefficient South, Fast
Northern Innovation (LS < LN , T (0) < z
∗ < 12 , α > 2βLS)
0
z(t)
t
1/2
T(0)
z(0)
6.4.3 Evolution Dynamics: Fast Southern Learning
With fast learning pace in the South (2βLS > α), the country catches up with the North over
time – the technology stock of the South, T (t), improves gradually. It is found that with learning
function (6.5′), the South’s productivity schedule under this circumstance is:
aS(z, t) =

aN (z, t) = a¯e
−z−αt if z ≤ T (t) = T (0) + (βLS − α2 )t ,
a¯ez−2T (0)−2βLSt if z > T (t) = T (0) + (βLS − α2 )t .
(6.53)
With both countries’ progresses, the efficiency gap between their technologies diminishes, which
can be told by comparing the two schedules:
aS(z, t)
aN (z, t)
=

1 if z ≤ T (t) = T (0) + (βLS − α2 )t ,
e2z−2T (0)+(α−2βLS)t if z > T (t) = T (0) + (βLS − α2 )t .
(6.54)
As discussed earlier, the initial offshoring threshold locates between the Southern technology
stock T (0) and the wage-equalization point z∗. After the multinational production chain is formed,
within a certain period of time, the offshoring threshold z¯(t) is still within the range (T (t), z∗). The
reason and logic is the same as discussed in early chapters. During this time period, the equilibrium
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is characterized by
e2z¯(t)−2T (0)+(α−2βLS)t =
1− z¯(t)
z¯(t)
× LS
LN
, (6.55)
wS(t) =
z¯(t)
LS
, (6.56)
wN (t) =
1− z¯(t)
LN
. (6.57)
From the conditions above, it is easy to tell that the scope of tasks conducted in the South in later
time periods is greater than the initial task scope: z¯(t) > z¯(0) at t > 0.6 Namely, compared with
the initial pattern of task allocation, the South receives more tasks to conduct in later time.
The story is that as the South catches up with the North with fast learning, it can carry
out tasks more efficiently, even in terms of the relative productivity with respect to the North.
Therefore, more tasks are offshored to take advantage of the cost reduction. Hence, the scope of
task expands in developing countries, as displayed in Figure 6.9.
Figure 6.9: Dynamics of Task Offshoring: an Initially Inefficient South, Fast Southern Learning
(z∗ > T (0), α < 2βLS)
0 1
Unit Labor 
Requirement
z
North at t=0
South at t=0
South at t>0
North at t>0
T(0) T(t) z*z(t)z(0) 
Expansion of Task Scope in the South Examining condition (6.55), it is the case that7
6 With α < 2βLS , comparing the equilibrium conditions (6.32) and (6.55), it can be told.
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dz¯(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
T (t)<z¯(t)<z∗
= −(α− 2βLS)× z¯(t) (1− z¯(t))
1 + 2z¯(t) (1− z¯(t)) > 0 , (6.58)
d2z¯(t)
dt2
∣∣∣∣
T (t)<z¯(t)<z∗

< 0 when z¯(t) > 12 ,
= 0 when z¯(t) = 12 ,
> 0 when z¯(t) < 12 .
(6.59)
As long as the Southern technology stock T (t) is below z∗, it is always the case that z¯(t) ∈ (T (t), z∗),
and the evolution pattern described above applies. With the learning effect, the technology stock
T (t) keeps moving toward the complex activities and will reach z∗ at some time t∗. Once this is the
situation(T (t∗) = z∗), the South has the best up-to-date technologies available for all the tasks that
are conducted in the country. The offshoring threshold will also be at z∗ then: z¯(t∗) = T (t∗) = z∗.
After t∗, the Southern technology stock moves even further – the South is catching up with the
North on even more complicated activities. With T (t) > z∗, following the same logic as in Section
6.3.3, the offshoring threshold will not move further beyond z∗. Therefore, in this case, z∗ serves
as the long-run steady state of task allocation.
Given different relative positions of T (0) and z∗, how the task allocation may evolve varies.
Figure 6.10 shows two possible evolution paths of the offshoring threshold z¯(t). In Panel A, the size
of the South is relatively large: z¯(0) < 12 < z
∗. In contrast, Panel B shows the evolution progress
with a small South: z∗ < 12 . In both situations, the task scope of the South expands until all tasks
below z∗ are offshored. In the long run, even though the South may actually catch up with the
North on all activities (T (t) = 1 at some time t), no more than z∗ will be offshored.
6.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter is an extension of the basic model introduced in Chapter 3, incorporating an
important factor that influences how the multinational production chain may evolve over time –
innovation. Technology innovations occurring in developed countries constantly push the world’s
7 See Appendix C.2.2 for the derivation of d
2z¯(t)
dt2
∣∣
T (t)<z¯(t)<z∗ .
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Figure 6.10: Evolution of Offshoring Threshold: A Initially Inefficient South, Fast Southern
Learning (z∗ > T (0), α < 2βLS)
(a) Panel A: A Relatively Large South: z¯(0) < 12 < z
∗
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t
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1/2
z(0)
(b) Panel B: A Relatively Small South: z∗ < 12
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t
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z(0)
T(0)
efficiency frontier to newer limits. This creates room for constant learning in the South, and it also
raises the possibility that the efficiency gap between the two countries widens over time. When the
learning effect in the South is not adequate to lead the country to catch up with the North, reshoring
will occur, where the previously offshored activities return to the originating home country, even
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though the factor price in the South is lower relative to that in the North during the reshoring
process. Certainly, the ongoing reshoring trend may be out of various incentives of firms. The
production-efficiency advantage of developed countries is one critical factor that contributes to the
development of this trend.
The technologically less advanced country here is still able to climb up the global value
chain, as it does in models in previous chapters. This is achieved by fast learning within the
country. When the South learns faster than the North can innovate, it catches up with the latter
gradually, which then enables more sophisticated activities to be offshored. Essentially, the change
of relative efficiency of the two countries is the key driving offshoring evolution over time.
Several limitation are involved in developing the task-based framework of global production.
These can be addressed in future research. First, consider a framework with more players (e.g.,
three countries). The interaction among countries’ characteristics may bring richer descriptions
with regard to how countries may evolve along the global value chain respectively. The position
and task scope of countries may display quite different evolution paths – a country may conduct
fewer but all the more sophisticated tasks. Then the phrase, “moving up the global value chain,”
will have different meanings and dynamics to be considered.
Another limitation here relates to firm identification. In the basic framework, firms do not
play a critical role. In the monopolistic competition model, symmetric firms have been assumed,
with plants in the same country performing the same set of tasks. This provides convenience
for the theoretical analyses here, but it may sacrifice flexibility in discussing firm dynamics. A
possible avenue for future research is thus to consider firms as collections of tasks that are not
necessarily symmetric, with each conducting a certain range of tasks along the spectrum and/or
with heterogeneous productivities. This will provide opportunities to study the firm dynamics and
thus may offer further empirical investigation possibilities.
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Appendix A
Derivations for Chapter 3
A.1 Transition Dynamics of Task Offshoring
A.1.1 Evolution of Technology Stock with Learning-by-Doing
(1) Derivation of Equation (3.29)
First, note that LS(z, t) = 0 for all z > z¯(t) at any time t. For tasks z ≤ z¯(t), from (3.7)
and (3.13),
LS(z, t) =
1
wS(t)
. (A.1)
With (3.27), the technology stock accumulation function (3.6) turns to
dT (t)
dt
=
∫ z¯(t)
T (t)
βLS(z, t)dz =
∫ z¯(t)
T (t)
β × 1
wS(t)
dz =
∫ z¯(t)
T (t)
β
LS
z¯(t)
dz
= βLS × z¯(t)− T (t)
z¯(t)
.
(A.2)
(2) Derivation of (3.32): d
2T (t)
dt2
< 0
By examining (3.29), it is found that
d2T (t)
dt2
= −βLS × 1
z¯(t)2
×
(
z¯(t)
dT (t)
dt
− T (t)dz¯(t)
dt
)
. (A.3)
During the evolution process, it is the case that z¯(t) > T (t) > 0 and dT (t)dt >
dz¯(t)
dt > 0.
Therefore, it is easy to tell that d
2T (t)
dt2
< 0 along the way.
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A.1.2 Evolution of Offshoring Threshold with Learning-by-Doing
From (3.26), (3.29) and (3.30), it can be calculated that
d2z¯(t)
dt2
=
{
−βLS
z¯(t)
× 1
1 + 2z¯(t) (1− z¯(t)) − βLS × 2 (z¯(t)− T (t))×
2 [1− z¯(t)]2 + 1
[1 + 2z¯(t) (1− z¯(t))]2
}
× dz¯(t)
dt
(A.4)
Given the condition that 0 < T (t) < z¯(t) < 1 and dz¯(t)dt > 0, it is the case that
d2z¯(t)
dt2
< 0 before the
steady state is reached.
A.2 Dynamics of National Welfare and Gains from Offshoring
A.2.1 Evolution of Output with Learning-by-Doing
(1) Output Amount at t
Given the production function (3.1), the unit labor requirement functions (3.2) and (3.5),
as well as (3.7), (3.8), (3.13), and the equilibrium conditions (3.26) – (3.28), it is the case
that
lnY (t) =
∫ 1
0
lnx(z, t)dz
=
∫ T (t)
0
ln
1
wS(t)× a¯e−z dz +
∫ z¯(t)
T (t)
ln
1
wS(t)× a¯ez−2T (t)
dz +
∫ 1
z¯(t)
ln
1
wN (t)× a¯e−z dz
= z¯(t)2 − T (t)2 + ln LN
a¯(1− z¯(t)) +
1
2
(A.5)
This indicates that the total world output at time t can be expressed as
Y (t) =
LN
a¯(1− z¯(t)) × e
z¯(t)2−T (t)2 × e 12 (A.6)
(2) Derivation of Equation (3.34)
Given the output expression (3.33),
dY (t)
dt
= Y (t)×
[
2z¯(t)
dz¯(t)
dt
− 2T (t)dT (t)
dt
+
1
1− z¯(t)
dz¯(t)
dt
]
. (A.7)
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Given (3.30), (A.7) can be simplified to
dY (t)
dt
= Y (t)× 2[z¯(t)− T (t)]dT (t)
dt
. (A.8)
During the evolution process before arriving at the steady state, z¯(t) > T (t), and dT (t)dt > 0,
and thus it is the case that dY (t)dt > 0.
(3) Derivation of Equation (3.35)
Given (3.33) and (3.34),
d2Y (t)
dt2
=
dY (t)
dt
× 2 [z¯(t)− T (t)] dT (t)
dt
+ Y (t)× 2
[
dz¯(t)
dt
− dT (t)
dt
]
× dT (t)
dt
+ Y (t)× 2 [z¯(t)− T (t)]× d
2T (t)
dt2
=Y (t)× 4 [z¯(t)− T (t)]2 ×
(
dT (t)
dt
)2
+ Y (t)× 2
[
dz¯(t)
dt
− dT (t)
dt
]
× dT (t)
dt
+ Y (t)× 2 [z¯(t)− T (t)]× d
2T (t)
dt2
(A.9)
With (3.29), (3.30) and (A.3), it is simplified to
d2Y (t)
dt2
= 4Y (t)×
(
dT (t)
dt
)2
×A (z¯(t), T (t)) , (A.10)
where A (z¯(t), T (t)) = [z¯(t)− T (t)]2 − 1+[1−z¯(t)][z¯(t)−T (t)]1+2z¯(t)[1−z¯(t)] . With the condition that 0 <
T (t) < z¯(t) < 1, A (z¯(t), T (t)) ∈ (−1, 0). Therefore, d2Y (t)
dt2
< 0 before multinational
production arrives at the steady state.
A.2.2 Evolution of Southern Welfare with Learning-by-Doing
Differentiating (3.39), together with (3.30), (3.34), (A.3) and (A.10), it is obtained that
d2ωS(t)
dt2
= 4Y (t)z¯(t)×
(
dT (t)
dt
)2
×Θ (z¯(t), T (t))
− Y (t)× 2βLS
1 + 2z¯(t)(1− z¯(t)) ×
1 + 2(1− z¯(t))(z¯(t)− T (t))
1 + 2z¯(t)(1− z¯(t)) ×
dT (t)
dt
,
(A.11)
where Θ (z¯(t), T (t)) = (z¯(t)− T (t))2 + (1−z¯(t))(z¯(t)−T (t))−11+2z¯(t)(1−z¯(t)) + (1−2z¯(t))(1−z¯(t))[1+2z¯(t)(1−z¯(t))]3 . With 0 < T (t) <
z¯(t) < 1, Θ (z¯(t), T (t)) ∈ (−1, 0). Therefore, it is the case that d2ωS(t)
dt2
< 0 during the offshoring
evolution process before the steady state is reached.
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A.2.3 Evolution of Northern Welfare with Learning-by-Doing
Differentiating (3.38),
dωN (t)
dt
= −Y (t)dz¯(t)
dt
+ (1− z¯(t))dY (t)
dt
. (A.12)
With (3.26), (3.30) and (3.34), it can be simplified to
dωN (t)
dt
= 2Y (t)× (1− z¯(t))× dT (t)
dt
× Λ(z¯(t)) , (A.13)
where Λ(z¯(t)) = − z¯(t)1+2z¯(t)(1−z¯(t)) + 12 ln
[
LS
LN
× 1−z¯(t)z¯(t)
]
. The sign of dωN (t)dt is determined by Λ(z¯(t)).
Therefore, the cut-off value z˜N for sign change of Northern welfare is determined by the condition:
z
1 + 2z(1− z) =
1
2
ln
[
LS
LN
× 1− z
z
]
. (A.14)
For the above equation, the left-hand side is a monotonically increasing function of z, while the right-
hand side is a monotonically decreasing one, and thus the solution is unique. At z˜N ,
dωN (t)
dt = 0.
Before multinational production reaches the steady state, when z¯(t) < z˜N ,
dωN (t)
dt > 0; when
z¯(t) > z˜N ,
dωN (t)
dt < 0. When z¯(t) is very close to the steady state, the right-hand side of (A.14) is
close to zero, while the left-hand side is positive – Λ(z¯(t)) < 0 under this circumstance. Therefore,
at the latest stages when offshoring is close to the steady state, the North always experiences a
decline in its welfare.
Appendix B
Derivations for Chapter 4
B.1 Transition Dynamics of Task Offshoring
B.1.1 Evolution of Technology Stock with Learning-by-Doing
(1) Derivation of Equation (4.26)
By equation (4.13) and (4.19),
LS(z, t) =
ρ
wS(t)
. (B.1)
Recall that LS(z, t) = 0 for all z > z¯(t) at any time t and that all Southern plants are
symmetric. Together with (4.23′) and (4.25′), the technology accumulation function (4.12)
turns to
dT (t)
dt
=
∫ z¯(t)
T (t)
βLS(z, t)
J(t)
dz =
∫ z¯(t)
T (t)
β
J(t)
ρ
wS(t)
dz =
∫ z¯(t)
T (t)
β
J(t)
LS
z¯(t)
dz
=
βLS
J(t)
z¯(t)− T (t)
z¯(t)
= βσf (1− ρz¯(t)) LS
LN
z¯(t)− T (t)
z¯(t)
.
(B.2)
(2) Derivation of (4.29): d
2T (t)
dt2
< 0
By examining (4.26), it is obtained that
d2T (t)
dt2
= −βLS
J(t)
× 1
z¯(t)2
×
(
z¯(t)
dT (t)
dt
− T (t)dz¯(t)
dt
)
− βσρf × LS
LN
× z¯(t)− T (t)
z¯(t)
× dz¯(t)
dt
.
(B.3)
It is easy to tell that d
2T (t)
dt2
< 0 before it reaches the steady state.
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B.1.2 Evolution of Offshoring Threshold with Learning-by-Doing
From examining (4.26) and (4.27), d
2z¯(t)
dt2
can be derived as:
d2z¯(t)
dt2
=
{
− βLS
J(t)z¯(t)
× 1
1 + 2z¯(t) (1− ρz¯(t)) −
βLS
J(t)
× 2 (z¯(t)− T (t))× 2 [1− ρz¯(t)]
2 + ρ
[1 + 2z¯(t) (1− ρz¯(t))]2
}
× dz¯(t)
dt
− βσρf × LS
LN
× z¯(t)− T (t)
z¯(t)
× 2z¯(t) (1− ρz¯(t))
1 + 2z¯(t) (1− ρz¯(t)) ×
dz¯(t)
dt
.
(B.4)
It is not hard to tell from the result that d
2z¯(t)
dt2
< 0 before the steady state is reached.
B.2 Evolution of Number of Variety with Learning-by-Doing
B.2.1 Derivation of (4.30): dJ(t)dt > 0
By condition (4.25′),
dJ(t)
dt
=
ρLN
σf
× 1
[1− ρz¯(t)]2 ×
dz¯(t)
dt
, (B.5)
which is positive before z¯(t) arrives at its steady state.
B.2.2 Derivation of (4.30): d
2J(t)
dt2
< 0
Further examination of the condition (B.5), together with (4.26), (4.27) and the conditions
derived in Appendices B.1.1 and B.1.2, shows that
d2J(t)
dt2
=
βρLS
1− ρz¯(t) ×
dz¯(t)
dt
× 1
z¯(t) [1 + 2z¯(t) (1− ρz¯(t))]2×
{2z¯(t) (1− ρz¯(t)) [2 (z¯(t)− T (t)) (2ρz¯(t)− 1)− 1]− 1} ,
(B.6)
which is negative when z¯(t) moves to its steady state.
B.3 Evolution of Per-Brand Output with Learning-by-Doing
B.3.1 Derivation of Per-Brand Output – (4.33)
Given the production function (4.7) and the symmetry of firms, together with conditions
(4.8), (4.11), (4.13), (4.14), (4.19), and equilibrium conditions (4.22′), (4.23′), (4.24′), and (4.25′),
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it is the case that
lnY (t) =
∫ 1
0
lnx(z, j, t)dz
=
∫ T (t)
0
ln
(
1
J(t)
ρ
wS(t)a¯e−z
)
dz +
∫ z¯(t)
T (t)
ln
(
1
J(t)
ρ
wS(t)a¯ez−2T (t)
)
dz+∫ 1
z¯(t)
ln
(
1
J(t)
ρ
wN (t)a¯e−z
)
dz
=z¯(t)2 − T (t)2 + 1
2
+ ln
(
ρσf
a¯
)
.
(B.7)
This implies that the per-brand output Y (t) is
Y (t) =
ρσf
a¯
e
1
2 × ez¯(t)2−T (t)2 . (B.8)
B.3.2 Time Dynamics of Per-Brand Output
Given the per-brand output expressed by (4.33),
dY (t)
dt
= Y (t)× 2
[
z¯(t)
dz¯(t)
dt
− T (t)dT (t)
dt
]
. (B.9)
There is no deterministic relationship between z¯(t) z¯(t)dt and T (t)
dT (t)
dt , thus the path of Y (t) may be
non-monotonic. With (4.22′) and (4.27), it is found that there exists a stationary point z˜y, which
is determined by the following equation:
z
1 + 2z(1− ρz) =
1
2
ln
[
LS
LN
1− ρz
ρz
]
, (B.10)
that at z˜y,
dY (t)
dt = 0. The solution is unique, as the left-hand side of the equation above mono-
tonically increases in z, while the right-hand side of the equation monotonically decreases in z. By
examining the values of the left-hand-side and the right-hand-side of the equation above at z∗, it
is found that it must be the case: z˜y < z
∗. Similarly, the values examined at z = 0 indicate that
z˜y > 0.
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B.4 Dynamics of National Welfares
B.4.1 Derivation of dUS(t)dt
Given (4.36), together with condition (4.27),
dUS(t)
dt
=ρ×
(
LN
σf
) 1
ρ
× ρσf
a¯
× e 12 × (1− ρz¯(t))− 1ρ × ez¯(t)2−T (t)2 × dz¯(t)
dt
×{
(1− ρz¯(t)) + (z¯(t)− T (t))× [1 + 2z¯(t) (1− ρz¯(t))]
1− ρz¯(t)
}
,
(B.11)
which is non-negative, and is positive before z¯(t) reaches the steady state.
B.4.2 Dynamics of Northern Welfare UN (t)
Given (4.37), together with condition (4.27),
dUN (t)
dt
=
(
LN
σf
) 1
ρ
× ρσf
a¯
× e 12 × (1− ρz¯(t))− 1ρ × ez¯(t)2−T (t)2 × dz¯(t)
dt
×{
1− ρ+ 2z¯(t) (1− ρz¯(t))− T (t)
z¯(t)
− 2T (t) (1− ρz¯(t))
}
.
(B.12)
With condition (4.22′) and (4.27), it is found that there exists a stationary point z˜UN , which is
determined by
ρz
1 + 2z (1− ρz) =
1
2
ln
(
LS
LN
1− ρz
ρz
)
. (B.13)
At z˜UN ,
dUN (t)
dt = 0. The left-hand side of the equation above monotonically increases in z, while
the right-hand side monotonically decreases in z, and therefore the solution is unique. Moreover,
by comparing the values of the two sides of the equation at different points of z, it is found that
z˜UN > z˜y , (B.14)
and
z˜UN ∈ (0, z∗) . (B.15)
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B.5 Extreme-End Evolution
B.5.1 Derivation of (4.40)
Given the production function (4.7) and the symmetry of firms, together with conditions
(4.8), (4.11), (4.13), (4.14), (4.19), (4.23′), (4.24′), (4.25′), and the condition that z¯(t) = 1, it is the
case that
lnY (t)′ =
∫ 1
0
lnx(z, j, t)dz
=
∫ T (t)
0
ln
(
1
J(t)
ρ
wS(t)a¯e−z
)
dz +
∫ 1
T (t)
ln
(
1
J(t)
ρ
wS(t)a¯ez−2T (t)
)
dz
= ln
LSf
LN a¯
− T (t)2 + 2T (t)− 1
2
.
(B.16)
This implies that the per-brand output Y (t)′ is
Y (t)′ =
LSf
LN a¯
× e−(T (t)−1)2+ 12 . (B.17)
B.5.2 Derivation of dY (t)
′
dt
Given (4.40),
dY (t)′
dt
=
LSf
LN a¯
× e−(T (t)−1)2+ 12 × [2 (1− T (t))]× dT (t)
dt
, (B.18)
which is positive when T (t) < 1 and dT (t)dt > 0.
B.6 Northern Gains from Offshoring under Complete Offshoring
From (4.59),
U∗′N
UAN
=
LS
LN
× 1
ρ
× (1− ρ)2− 1ρ . (B.19)
The function 1ρ × (1 − ρ)2−
1
ρ is monotonically decreasing in ρ on the interval (0, 1). Thus, with
ρ < LSLS+LN in the extreme offshoring case,
U∗′N
UAN
>
U∗′N
UAN
∣∣∣∣(ρ = LSLS + LN ) =
(
LS + LN
LN
)LN
LS
> 1. (B.20)
Therefore, the North’s national welfare is higher with offshoring in the long run than under au-
tarky.
Appendix C
Derivations for Chapter 6
C.1 The Evolution Dynamics: An Initially Efficient South, Fast Northern
Innovation
From (6.25), z¯(t) = LS
LS+LNe
(α−2βLS)t . Together with the condition (6.25), it is found:
d2z¯(t)
dt2
= L2S × LN × e(α−2βLS)t × (α− 2βLS)2 ×
1[
LS + LNe(α−2βLS)t
]3 × [1− z¯(t)z¯(t) − 1
]
. (C.1)
With α > 2βLS , the sign of
d2z¯(t)
dt2
depends on the last term in the function above. Therefore, it is
the case that
d2z¯(t)
dt2
=

< 0 when z¯(t) > 12 ,
= 0 when z¯(t) = 12 ,
> 0 when z¯(t) < 12 .
(C.2)
C.2 The Evolution Dynamics: An Initially Inefficient South
C.2.1 Evolution Dynamics: Fast Northern Innovation
Examining (6.49), with condition (6.45), it is found:
d2z¯(t)
dt2
∣∣∣∣
T (0)≤z¯(t)<z∗
= −(α− 2βLS)× 1
[1 + 2z¯(t)(1− z¯(t))]2 × (1− 2z¯(t))×
dz¯(t)
dt
. (C.3)
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With α > 2βLS and
dz¯(t)
dt < 0, the sign of
d2z¯(t)
dt2
depends on the term 1 − 2z¯(t) in the function
above. Therefore, it is the case that
d2z¯(t)
dt2
∣∣∣∣
T (0)≤z¯(t)<z∗
=

< 0 when z¯(t) > 12 ,
= 0 when z¯(t) = 12 ,
> 0 when z¯(t) < 12 .
(C.4)
C.2.2 Evolution Dynamics: Fast Southern Learning
Examining (6.58), with condition (6.55), it is found:
d2z¯(t)
dt2
∣∣∣∣
T (t)<z¯(t)<z∗
= −(α− 2βLS)× 1
[1 + 2z¯(t)(1− z¯(t))]2 × (1− 2z¯(t))×
dz¯(t)
dt
. (C.5)
With α < 2βLS and
dz¯(t)
dt > 0, the sign of
d2z¯(t)
dt2
depends on the term 1 − 2z¯(t) in the function
above. Therefore, it is the case that
d2z¯(t)
dt2
∣∣∣∣
T (t)<z¯(t)<z∗
=

< 0 when z¯(t) > 12 ,
= 0 when z¯(t) = 12 ,
> 0 when z¯(t) < 12 .
(C.6)
